Of Constitutional Recognition for the Adivasis in Bangladesh

Like other countries of the world, the adivasis of Bangladesh celebrated the 9th August, the international day of the world’s indigenous peoples, with a theme on ‘the right to culture and identity’. The national dailies in Bangladesh published news features and analyses into the theme with due importance. At different seminars and workshops, the adivasi leaders raised a suite of demands; however, the demand of constitutional recognition has gained momentum over all of them. Although all leaders have raised voices for constitutional recognition, we are yet to be clarified of a few questions. Will the adivasi issue get priority on the list of constitutional amendments? How does the amendment look like? Is it through revision to the existing clauses or adding new clauses to the constitution? Do the adivasi leaders have a common understanding of what ‘rights for the adivasis’ could be incorporated into the constitution, while amending it?

A meeting of the Parliamentary Caucus on indigenous affairs chaired by Rashed Khan Menon, MP (middle).
Photo by Abhilash Tripura

No one can deny the fact that the list of the adivasis’ problems is long. Correspondingly the demand list is too. But all demands invariably will not be accommodated in the constitution. Given this reality, I would propose the adivasi leaders to put the constitutional recognition on the top of their priority action list during the AL-led grand alliance government’s tenure. To me, the attainment of constitutional recognition will largely depend on fulfilling the three interrelated hypotheses, which must be considered by the adivasi leaders. First, despite the parliament has the sovereign power in making laws, the constitutional recognition for the adivasis will depend on the very will of the prime minister. Hence, her consent is the first and foremost necessary. Second, the adivasi leaders must have a common understanding and consensus on what rights could be proposed to the government; and third, a strong mass people’s opinion has to be formed through making advocacy with the supportive elements including the special parliamentary body on constitutional amendment and the parliamentary caucus on indigenous issues. But the tough question is: who will ring the bell? Obviously it is the adivasi leaders, who must take the gauntlet up first.

According to the sources of different dailies, the government already has constituted a special parliamentary body on constitutional amendments with the deputy leader of the house Sajeda Chowdhury in the chair. This body is expected to start its works without delay in accordance with the Supreme Court’s judgement over the fifth constitutional amendment. It is not clear yet whether the parliamentary body will consider the adivasis’ issues other than the court’s findings and observations.

As concerns the first hypothesis, we can infer a thesis from the present Bangladesh political culture that the inclusion of constitutional recognition for the adivasis in the parliamentary body’s amendment agenda will categorically depend on the prime minister’s ‘yes’ or ‘no’. At this backdrop, all adivasi leaders, who I refer to are the five elected adivasi MPs from AL, CHT Regional Council, three Hill District Councils (HDCs) and three Circle chiefs, regardless of their political affiliation or ideological stance, have to agree on only one issue - constitutional recognition for the adivasis. They must work together to convince the prime minister into her saying ‘yes’ to this issue. At the same time, they must make concerted efforts to draw support for the issue from the special parliamentary body on constitutional amendments; the parliamentary caucus on indigenous issues; the cabinet members and leaders of the opposition, who are supportive to the adivasi cause.

It is also noteworthy that simply the prime minister’s or the special parliamentary body’s good intention will not work well. Hence, to achieve the goal of constitutional recognition will largely depend upon the well-prepared homework by the adivasi leaders.

Thus the second hypothesis stipulates that the adivasi leaders first have to do own homework. During the homework, they have to prioritise their demands. Obviously there is a long list of demands that include a roadmap for implementation of the CHT Accord; recognition as adivasi in lieu of ‘small ethnic groups’ (khudro nrigosthi); the rights to language, culture and traditional lands; reservation of seats for the three constituencies in the CHT as well as the local government councils, where the larger adivasis population lives; formation of a national commission on adivasi affairs; and a separate land commission for the adivasis in the plain regions. But the big challenge lies ahead of them is how to get these demands incorporated into the constitution? Given the long ‘wish list’, the adivasi leaders must be strategic in placing the demands to the special parliamentary body, whether it is making the amendments or revisions to the existing clauses or adding new ones to the constitution. It is high time for them to agree on ‘what rights’ will be proposed under the rubric of ‘constitutional recognition’.

In defining the strategies, the adivasi leaders might consider the example of the Indian constitution, which applied a three-pronged strategy to ensure the rights of the Scheduled Tribes (ST). These strategies are 1) protective arrangements which provide the ‘tribals’ with reserved seats in the parliament as well as local government councils, and the minority commission to protect the interests of the minority people; 2) affirmative actions that guarantee the tribal people’s rights to have access to education and employment; and 3) development resources. Under this strategy provision, the Indian government is obliged to earmark a special allocation of its national budget for the development of ‘backward’ areas.

In Bangladesh, we have got ‘affirmative action’ provisions under the clauses 28 & 29 of the constitution, but they suffer from clarity. On the other hand, the successive Bangladeshi governments did not make any laws or policies to elaborate those clauses in favour of its adivasis. Hence, it is imperative for the adivasi leaders to analyse these affirmative clauses in order to make them more favourable for the adivasis. To be more realistic in setting strategies, they must consult the constitution experts. Another aspect of the Bangladesh constitution is also notable that it does not have any provisions on the protective arrangements and development resources exclusively for the adivasis. Therefore, to enforce the rights of the adivasis, especially their collective rights over lands and resources, language and culture, and economic development, the constitution must include some provisions with special reference to the adivasi issues. To this effect, the demand for a national commission on indigenous affairs is justifiable. Simultaneously the CHT Accord must be provided with a constitutional safeguard.

The third hypothesis stipulates that the issue of constitutional recognition has to be recognised as ‘national responsibility’ not only by the adivasi leaders, but also by the ruling party Awami League and its alliances such as the Jatiya Party (JP) and the leftist parties. If the ruling party and its alliances do not feel of such responsibility, all cries for constitutional recognition by the adivasi leaders will end up to ‘wild-goose chase’. As such, the adivasi leaders must make all out efforts to draw supports from the ruling party and its alliances for constitutional recognition. Yet there are challenges ahead, as many of the ruling party’s law-makers including civil-military bureaucrats are unaware of indigenous issues or they do have prejudice against the adivasis. It is needless to explain that these civil-military bureaucrats do have more influence over the policy-making process. The political bureaucrats sometimes cannot overlook their views. Keeping this reality into account, the adivasi leaders must focus on launching multi-level ‘diplomacy’ with different political actors, civil-military bureaucrats and relevant stakeholders towards creating a congenial and favourable atmosphere rather than showing a political gimmick in the street. At this point, already there exist some favourable forces such as some friendly law-makers and cabinet members within the ruling party and the parliamentary caucus on indigenous issues headed by the progressive leftist leaders like Rashed Khan Menon MP and Hasanul Huq Inu MP, who are very much supportive to the adivasis. The adivasi leaders could capitalise on their good offices to go ahead with the ‘diplomacy’ program into forming a strong opinion for constitutional recognition; but they must first decide on the strategies collectively. However, the question is: who, among the adivasi leaders and representative organisations, will do what towards fulfilling the afore-mentioned hypotheses?

In response to the afore-mentioned question, I would propose that Bangladesh Adivasi Forum (BAF), as a representative organisation in the whole Bangladesh, must play the role of a vanguard right now. However, to ensure its political legitimacy of representation, and to chalk out a realistic program of actions, it must closely work with the indigenous people’s organisations across the country. To direct the actions into an achievable goal, BAF could consider appointing a ‘working group’ with honourable, acceptable and independent individuals who have expertise on the relevant fields. This working group should be constituted not only with indigenous persons, but also with renowned non-indigenous persons who are more sensitised with the adivasi issues. The working group could be entrusted with specific tasks such as studying the constitution and preparing a framework of ‘what rights’ could be included within the scope of ‘constitutional recognition’. If necessary, the working group could continue dialogues with the relevant stakeholders including the parliamentary bodies like the special body on constitutional amendments, and the parliamentary caucus on indigenous affairs. In addition to the working group, the adivasi leaders could nominate a respectable and impartial person as a ‘goodwill ambassador’, who will act as a bridge between the policy-makers in the government and the opposition party and the adivasi leaders. Thus he or she will help to draw supports for the constitutional recognition by reducing the differences between them. To bring all these ideas into action, BAF should take hold of the steering in the drive of constitutional recognition of the adivasis.

The present government has some three years to go. At this point of time, the adivasi leaders bear in mind that all, whatever they wish to do, have to be accomplished during the present government’s tenure. If they miss the chance, the dream for constitutional recognition likely will never come to true; because no one can guarantee an adivasi friendly government with such absolute majority, as the present government has had it, in the future. Another point to note is that the demand for constitutional recognition of the adivasis is not a brainchild of BAF, PCJSS or UPDF, but it is an aspiration which is a precondition for establishing an inclusive democracy and thereby establishing a just and equitable society in Bangladesh on the whole. Therefore, the common adivasis now long for an ideal situation, where the adivasi leaders regardless of their political ideology or political affiliation with AL, BNP, PCJSS or UPDF, and giving up all their egos and personal disliking to each other, speak together in one voice – the “constitutional recognition for the adivasis now or never”. We are eagerly looking forward to their historic role at this juncture of history.