Sunday, January 30, 2011

The Concepts and Realities of Indigenous Self-determination: A Case of Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh

--> -->  Executive summary
The right to self-determination is a universal human right applicable for all including indigenous peoples. This right has been recognised in international laws such as ICCPR and IESCR. Recently the UN explicitly has recognized the indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination through the adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). However, many States tend to interpret the right to self-determination in traditional decolonization context i.e. secession or independence. They argue that indigenous peoples do not qualify for the right to self-determination. As such, the denial of indigenous self-determination has given rise to the armed resistance or insurgencies against many States across the world.
In the context, this paper examines the struggle for reclaiming the rights to self-determination of indigenous peoples in Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), Bangladesh. This paper argues that the indigenous movement in CHT emerged from the continual denial of their rights to self-rule, and that struggle reached its extreme form – armed resistance against the government, when the State of Bangladesh completely ignored the indigenous people’s history, languages, culture and ethnic identities in the statebuilding process. In the name of ‘national integration’ and ‘unitary character’ of the state, Bangladesh denied the indigenous rights in the Bangladesh constitution.
Following the state’s outright denial of self-determination and their distinct identities, indigenous peoples of CHT organised themselves under a political platform and they demanded autonomy with constitutional guarantee. The State considered the indigenous autonomy movement as a threat to the national sovereignty and independence. Consequently the nation state of Bangladesh undertook repressive measures such as militarization and ‘minoritisation’ of indigenous peoples by bringing the Bengali settlers from the plains into CHT. These measures served the purpose of the total extermination of indigenous people.
To resist the repressive government move of the GoB, the PCJSS, an indigenous political party, continued guerrilla war against the government since the mid ‘70s onwards. Although indigenous leaders took resort to an armed resistance, they did not claim independence or secession from Bangladesh. Instead, as means of exercising their right to self-determination they sought an authentic self-government within the state system of Bangladesh.              
Finally, the GoB realized the importance of political solution to indigenous problem through dialogues with indigenous leaders. This negotiation resulted in a peace agreement, called the CHT Accord, by ending the armed conflict in 1997.
Through the Accord, the GoB has recognised regional autonomy, under which it has created special governance institutions such as special ministry, one regional council and three hill district councils with indigenous leadership. The GoB has recognised indigenous political representation in state affairs, and their economic, social and cultural development through these institutions, but due to lack of political support of the central government these indigenous led institutions have not been able yet to fully exercise their authority for own development.
Therefore, it follows that, to implement the right to self-determination of indigenous peoples largely depends on the political will of the state, and the rights are determined through political process, in which the State has the upper-hand.  

--> Section 1:INTRODUCTION

1.1 background of the research problem

The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) of Bangladesh comprising three Hill Districts namely Rangamati, Khagrachari and Bandarban in the south-eastern region is a home to eleven indigenous communities[1] with a population of approximately 0.7 million. Immediately after independence of Bangladesh, indigenous peoples of CHT challenged the mono-national and monocultural nation-building paradigm. Under the leadership of PCJSS[2], an indigenous political party, they started a movement for the right of self-determination since 1970s and onwards (Uttaran, 1985 and Jimi, 1985). Initially the struggle was carried out through democratic means such as sending representation to the government, but after 1976 it turned into an underground movement. Behind this indigenous movement for the right of self-determination, one of the major contributing factors was the continual denial of indigenous self-rules by the successive regimes – from the British colonial rule to Pakistan and the present nation-state of Bangladesh (ibid). 
Before the advent of British colonisation, the indigenous peoples of CHT were ‘internally supreme and externally free’ under the leadership of the traditional kings (Larma, 2003:1), but through annexation of CHT with the British colony the authority of the traditional kings had been curtailed by the colonial rulers. However, the colonial rulers retained the indigenous self-rule system under certain legislative measures such as the CHT Regulation 1900[3] (ibid). Following the departure of the colonial rulers, CHT came under Pakistan. The Pakistani regime threatened the identity and cultures of indigenous peoples in two ways: by making amendments to the legal safeguards (e.g. CHT Regulation 1900) to open CHT for outsiders; and appropriating resources in the name of national economy (Zaman, 1982). Then immediately being independent from Pakistan in 1971, the rulers of newly independent Bangladesh did not include any provisions in the constitution for indigenous peoples of CHT. Rather by inserting ‘Bengali nationalism[4]’ in the first constitution, Bangladesh was made a “unilingual and unicultural nation state”, without any reference to ethnic nationalities in Bangladesh (Islam, 1981:1219 and cf. Chakma, 2010: 286).
This assimilationist approach to nation-building had been challenged by M.N. Larma, then only indigenous MP in the parliament. He demanded constitutional recognition of the indigenous peoples while a constitution was in the making for the newly independent Bangladesh. Simultaneously, for the first time, on 16 February 1972 an indigenous delegation led by M. N. Larma placed four-point demands including autonomy for CHT with constitutional guarantee to the then president and the ‘father of the nation’ Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Larma, 2003; Zaman, 1981; Husain, 1997). Instead of listening to their demands, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman asked the delegation to merge into the Bangali by discarding own ethnic identities (CHTC, 1991:14). 
Consequently this non-recognition of indigenous rights led to formation of an indigenous political party PCJSS under the leadership of M.N. Larma. In defiance of Bengali nationalism, PCJSS constructed a political and territorial identity jumma to unify all indigenous groups in CHT under one social umbrella (Dewan, 2010:11; Van-Schedel, 1992: 121). PCJSS has set the “rights to self-determination with constitutional guarantee” as one of its objectives towards establishing the indigenous rights in CHT (PCJSS, n.d). 
In response to the demand for autonomy, interchangeably self-determination, the state adopted two strategies: “militarisation and flooding the CHT region with landless Bengalis from the plains” (Arens and Chakma, 2002; Chakma, 2010). The government increased military forces across CHT. At the same time, Bengali settlers from outside were brought into CHT under the government sponsorship – thus making the conflict between the indigenous people and Bengalis from bad to the worse. As a counter response, PCJSS launched its military wing Shanti Bahini[5] since 1976 to resist the Bangladesh establishment. During the conflict period (from 1976 to 1997) a large number of massacres and gross human rights violations took place across the CHT.
To end the long-standing armed conflict politically, the Bangladesh government signed an agreement, popularly known as CHT Peace Accord, with PCJSS on December 2, 1997. The Accord does not include any term ‘autonomy’ or ‘self-determination’ conspicuously; nonetheless it has provided a basis for a limited ‘regional autonomy’ in CHT. Despite the prospect of autonomy, during the last 12 year period, the CHT institutions constituted within the framework of the Accord have not been empowered to exercise their power and functions properly due to non-cooperation of the central government (Larma, 2003).

1.2 research questions addressed

Considering the afore-mentioned background, this paper examines the question: how indigenous leaders have conceptualised and used the concept of the right to self-determination of indigenous peoples in CHT within the nation-state of Bangladesh? In order to answer this question, this paper (a) explores the concepts of self-determination in general; (b) analyses to what extent the CHT Accord 1997 has addressed the ‘autonomy’ for CHT within the scope of self-determination; and (c) analyses the challenges for establishing the right of indigenous self-determination within the nation-state of Bangladesh.

1.3 methodology

This study mainly has been based on the secondary sources of data. Necessary literature has been collected from various sources, which could be categorised into two: first, academic journal articles and books; and second, reports, statements and legal documents published by various human rights organisations, political parties, UN agencies and development organisations and the dailies from Bangladesh. As the researcher is fluent in Bengali other than English, it has been an added advantage for the study to review resources published both in English and Bengali.
For conceptual clarity and theoretical understanding of self-determination, necessary academic journals, books and UN documents, especially the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) have been reviewed. These documents are mostly collected from online sources. 
To understand the indigenous struggle for the right of self-determination in CHT, as much as possible the resources on CHT issues have been reviewed. The main sources of data were journal articles, seminar papers, dailies and reports and statements published by human rights organisations and political parties, largely by PCJSS. To complement secondary data with primary data, the researcher had opportunity to discuss with a few indigenous leaders and activists over telephone and emails. However, the large portion of data collected from secondary sources. 

1.4 literature review

There is a dearth of literature in the area of self-determination movement in CHT. Yet the researcher has made attempts to collect key literature from the three sources: reports human rights organisations; articles and reports from political parties and dailies; and journal articles. The materials from the first and second sources abound, but they have largely focused on human rights situations in CHT. A good number of rights organisations such as the Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission (CHTC), Unrepresented People’s Organisation (UNPO), and Amnesty International (AI) have regularly produced reports on the CHT situation, with a particular focus on human rights issues.
Out of the second sources, the PCJSS’ Information Department, in particular, published useful articles by Uttaran (1985), Jimi (1985) and Larma (2003). These authors provided the details of the CHT history and alienation processes of indigenous rights under various regimes from the British colonial rules to the present Bangladesh time. According to Uttaran indigenous peoples continuously were being subjected to marginalisation and the marginalisation process reached to a point of total extermination during the “Bengali Muslim nationalistic and Islamic fanatic” regime of Bangladesh due to non-recognition of the distinct history, culture and ethnic identities of indigenous peoples of CHT. Both Uttaran and Jimi argue, in the face of total extermination, indigenous people of CHT had no alternatives but to starting the movement for their right to self-determination towards safeguarding own “national existence”.
From the third sources, the key materials were the journal articles written by academics. Among them Islam (1981), Zaman (1982), Ahsan and Chakma (1989), Van-Schendel (1992), Husain (1997), Islam (2003), Mohsin (2003), Rashiduzzaman (1998), Roy (2005), Jamil and Pandey (2009) and Chakma (2010) are notable. Authors, who wrote before the CHT Accord of 1997, made attempts to diagnose the insurgency problem of CHT. Islam, Zaman, Ahsan and Chakma, and Husain identified the problem as a ‘national integrational’ crisis; while Van-Schendel examined the socio-cultural factors that gave rise to ‘jumma nationalism’, which, in turn, united different indigenous groups against the mainstream Bengali nationalism. Van-Schendel concludes that ‘jumma’ identity rejects the Bengali cultural model, and hence, the identity issue of indigenous peoples has to be taken into account by anyone while resolving the CHT crisis.
In the post-Accord period, most of the authors like Pandey and Jamil, and Mohsin analysed the causes of non-implementation of CHT Accord. They demonstrate that peace in CHT remains elusive due to the ‘top-down’ nature of the peace Accord. Mohsin, by analysing the economic and political marginalisation process of indigenous peoples, argues that the peace deal itself is hegemonic imposed by the hegemonic state without, addressing the root causes e.g. resolution of land disputes and Bengali settlement.  The hegemonic policy of the State has to be changed to ensure peace and development in CHT. 
Chakma demonstrates that the demand for autonomy has emerged from the state’s assimilationist and homogenising approach to nation-building. Immediately after independence in 1971, the ruling elites of Bangladesh adopted ‘mono national and mono-cultural state paradigm’ for nation building, without paying any attention to indigenous peoples.
In the post-Accord period, the government of Bangladesh instituted special governance institutions namely CHT Regional Council, and Hill District Councils for three districts towards ensuring indigenous people’s participation in the state’s affairs. Rashiduzzaman touches upon the potential power configuration of these new institutions under indigenous leadership in CHT. The author did not reach any conclusion, but raised a few questions, such as, would the power of these new institutions would diminish the State’s sovereignty? Would these institutions create a quasi-state within a State?  
Thus from the foregoing literature review, it is clear that the authors have not examined the indigenous people’s right to self-determination from theoretical and empirical aspects – how the indigenous peoples rights could be accommodated in the state system of Bangladesh. Despite the political agreement between the State and indigenous, there remains a question: can the CHT Accord ensure the indigenous people’s right to self-determination within the nation-state of Bangladesh

1.5 structure of the report  

The research findings have been presented in six sections. The section 1 discusses the background of the research problem, questions and methods of the study.  In section 2, the conceptual and empirical aspects of self-determination have been analysed. Section 3 provides an overview of the struggle of indigenous self-determination in CHT and the responses of the government of Bangladesh (GoB) to it; while section 4 analyses the contents of the CHT Peace Accord signed between the GoB and indigenous peoples represented by PCJSS. This section also discusses the obstacles to the implementation of the rights in the CHT Accord. Section 5 highlights the possible challenges in implementation of the rights to self-determination presenting the nation-state of Bangladesh. Finally, section 6 concludes with a recommendation for further study in the future. 



 
Section 2: The right to self-determination: the concept and practices
This section examines the concepts of self-determination followed by the indigenous people’s perspectives on self-determination. In doing so, this section will discuss: first, the evolution of the concept of self-determination; second, the scope of the right to self-determination in international laws, third, the debates on the right to self-determination between the States and indigenous peoples; fourth, indigenous rights to self-determination substantiated with a few examples of practices for indigenous peoples in other countries of the world.

2.1 the evolution of the concept of self-determination: from principle to right   

Initially the concept of self-determination was a ‘principle’ for liberation of people. Now it has become a ‘right’ in international human rights laws.
The origin of self-determination dates back to the eighteen century, particularly during the American Declaration of Independence in 1776 and the French Revolution in 1789 (Cassese, 1995; Barnsley and Bleiker, 2008). Later Lenin first systematically expounded the principle of self-determination as a criterion for liberation peoples from imperialism (Cassese, 1995:14). According to Lenin, this principle had three components: first, self-determination could be applied for ethnic or national groups who intended to decide own destiny freely; second, this would be applied during the aftermath of military conflicts between sovereign states for allocation of territories to one or another Power; and third, it was an anti-colonial postulate for liberation of all colonial countries (ibid). Contrary to Lenin, the US president Wilson explained self-determination from the Western democratic theory. According to Wilson, self-determination is about to freely choose own government by the peoples i.e. self-government based on the consent of the governed (Cassese, 1995; and Knight, 1985).
Following the establishment of League of Nations, the principle of self-determination had been a key concept of international relations. That time, self-determination was considered from the perspectives of sovereignty i.e. ‘peoples’ would be allowed to be free from external domination (Barnsley and Bleiker, 2008: 124).
Eventually with the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, the ‘principle’ of self-determination evolved into a ‘right’. For example, the UN Charter first includes self-determination as a principle to establish friendly relations among nations. Later this ‘principle’ was translated into a ‘right’ in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (IESCR) adopted by the UN in 1966. Both covenants have a common Article 1, which has recognised self-determination as a human right and it stipulates that: 
All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
By incorporating self-determination into ICCPR and IESCR, UN recognises it as both political right, and economic, social and cultural rights for all peoples.

2.2 the scope of the right to self-determination

As soon as ICCPR and IESCR have come into force, every State is legally bound to implement the right to self-determination, but how and by whom this right will be exercised is very much contested in international politics. The debates are centred on a good number of factors, such as who are the right-holders (“peoples”); does self-determination mean secession or integration or both and so forth, which have not been conspicuously addressed in international laws. However, to implement the right to self-determination, the UN Human Rights Committees on ICCPR and IESCR have interpreted self-determination in two aspects - external and internal (Cassese, 1995).
In general, the external aspect of self-determination applies to decolonisation context, and in some cases, to Non-Self-Governing Territories listed under Chapter XI of the UN Charter. However, to exercise the external aspect of self-determination i.e. to freely determine political status in Non-Self-Governing Territories depends on the ‘freely expressed will’ of the people concerned whether they choose to do so through creation of an independent state, or through the establishment of an association with an independent state or integration with an independent state (UN, 1960: principle vi). Henricksen (2001) argues that the external aspect of self-determination does not necessarily mean secession, but that too depends on how a State performs its duty towards a distinct people within its boundary. If a State progressively violates its obligation toward a people, it loses its legitimacy to rule over them. In that case, secession is considered to be an ultimate option for exercising the external aspect of self-determination. For instance, many States such as Bangladesh gained independence from Pakistan outside the colonial context (Knight, 1985). 
By contrast, the internal aspect of self-determination does not necessarily relate to decolonisation. In essence, it refers to the right to authentic self-government, by which a people can freely pursue its economic, social and cultural development (Cassese, 1995; and Henricksen, 2001). As such, with decolonisation or following independence of a new State, the right of the internal aspect of self-determination does not diminish; rather it is an ongoing right. Hence, the internal aspect of self-determination also refers to the right to exercise cultural, linguistic, religious, territorial or political autonomy within the boundaries of the existing State (Henricksen, 2001 and 1999).   
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the right to self-determination of all “peoples” firmly has been recognised in international law. As a universal human right, this right – whether external or internal – must be applied to all equally without discrimination. However, the indigenous people’s claim to the right to self-determination has been contested by many States at the UN forums. The major debates have centred on certain issues such as: who are “peoples” as mentioned in the ICCPR and IESCR? Do indigenous peoples deserve to be “peoples” to claim the right to self-determination? If they do, what aspects – external or internal - of self-determination do they deserve? Does the indigenous right to self-determination threaten the territorial integrity of the States? And so forth. The following section makes an attempt to address these questions. 

2.3 the debates on the right to self-determination: the state-centred approach versus indigenoue people’s views

Although ICCPR and IESCR have used the term ‘peoples’ as the holder of the right to self-determination, no international law has defined who are “peoples”. As such, in the absence of a clear definition, many States tend to define “peoples” from various perspectives to restrict the application of the right to self-determination for indigenous peoples. For example, one group holds that self-determination applies only to those “peoples” who are under conditions of classical colonialism; while the other group holds that “peoples” refers to the aggregate populations of independent states, as well as peoples in colonial territories. However, Anaya (2004:103) disapproves such state-centred conceptions of “peoples” as they are problematic from human rights perspectives, and are not consistent with the core values of the concept of self-determination – freedom and equality of all human beings.
In contrast to the state-centred conceptions, Henricksen (2001:8) provides the key features that constitute “peoples”, who are a group of individual human beings who enjoy some of the following common features: (1) a common historical tradition; (2) ethnic identity; (3) cultural homogeneity; (4) linguistic unity; (5) religious or ideological affinity; (5) territorial connection; and (6) common economic life. Henricksen also argues there must be ‘will’ or ‘consciousness’ to be a people, and institutions to express the identity of the people.

2.3.2 who are ‘indigenous peoples’? do they deserve the right to self-determination as ‘peoples’?

Like the term ‘peoples’, there is no consensus on the definition of ‘indigenous peoples’. However, many international organisations such as ILO and UNPFII have set key criteria to identify indigenous peoples instead of adopting an official definition. ILO Convention No. 169, in its Article 1.1 (b), defines indigenous peoples as: 
Peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions.
This definition of ILO includes a list of common characteristics to identify indigenous peoples. They include colonisation or conquest of indigenous territories by outsiders; and distinct social, economic, cultural and political institutions to retain own identities. Similarly, the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) has set a list of common features to identify indigenous peoples such as: (1) self-identification as indigenous peoples; (2) historical continuity with pre-colonial and/or pre-settler societies; (3) strong link to territories and surrounding natural resources; (4) distinct social, economic and political systems; (5) distinct language, culture and belief; (6) form non-dominant groups of society; (7) resolve to maintain and reproduce their ancestral environments and systems as distinct peoples and communities (UNPFII, n.d).  
Thus in terms of criteria as proffered by ILO and UNPFII’s, indigenous peoples can satisfy all conditions of ‘peoples’ and as ‘peoples’ they can claim the right to self-determination.  From the perspectives of human rights norms too, they are entitled to the right to self-determination, because human rights are universally applicable for all without any discrimination. Moreover, the right of self-determination as a collective human right is very essential for the survival of indigenous peoples. 
However, many States are reluctant to accept indigenous peoples as “peoples”. They argue that term “peoples” refers only to colonised peoples or the whole populations of independent States. As such, the right of self-determination does not apply to indigenous peoples. 
By refusing such statist argument, Anaya (2004) claims from human rights approach that indigenous peoples are entitled to the right of self-determination in two aspects: substantive aspects and remedial aspects.  According to Anaya, the substantive aspect of self-determination consists of two normative strains: constitutive aspect and on-going aspect; where the former aspect requires that the governing institutional order be substantially the creation of processes guided by the will of the people or peoples, governed. That is, the constitutive aspect is about ‘creation and change of a political order’ e.g. ‘authentic government’ freely determined by the people. While on-going self-determination relates to the institutional order that enables individuals and groups to make meaningful choices in matters touching upon all spheres of life on continuous basis i.e. people are able to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.  
Anaya’s second aspect is remedial self-determination, which refers to prescription necessary to implement the norm or violation of the norm. In other words, indigenous peoples are entitled to remedial aspect of self-determination in that they suffered from the denial of the substantive aspects of self-determination.   
In essence, as argued by Anaya, that indigenous peoples being culturally differentiated groups have been deprived of their substantive rights and suffered violations due to an oppressive form of governance during colonisation. In many cases, their deprivation has not changed even after decolonisation due to colonial legacy in the administrations, under which they live. Therefore, to benefit all, the right of self-determination must equally apply for all segments of humanity including indigenous peoples.  

2.3.3 territorial integrity and Indigenous self-determination: the states versus indigenoue peoples?

With regards to the right to self-determination of indigenous peoples, many States have raised concerns over territorial integrity. They reject such right for indigenous peoples on that ground that it may encourage secession and separatism (Castelino and Gilbert, 2003), but indigenous peoples do hold different view. According to some authors, such as Henricksen and Anaya, this statist view is solely based on the traditional decolonisation context, vis-à-vis the external aspect of self-determination, which obscures the human rights character of self-determination norm.
Against the state-centred view of territorial integrity, indigenous peoples consider self-determination from a human rights approach, which does not necessarily involve creation of a new State. First, they view the right to self-determination must be applied equally for all peoples without discrimination. Second, in implementing self-determination, the States must recognise distinct identities of indigenous peoples and their collective rights over land and resources, among others, towards full enjoyment of human rights of indigenous peoples (Lindroth, 2006). Thus territorial integrity cannot be a limitation to the enjoyment of indigenous self-determination. Lâm (2000:135) rightly puts this matter as follows: “indigenous peoples see themselves neither as states nor as fungible citizens, but as distinctive collectivities that must be simultaneously accorded some state-like powers as well as human rights protections”.
The UN first ever has expressly recognised their right to self-determination by adopting a Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in 2007. The UNDRIP in its Article 3 clearly states:    
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
In the same manner, as it was done in the ICCPR and IESCR, the UN has recognised the indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination in UNDRIP. Article 3 of the UNDRIP by itself indicates that indigenous peoples’ rights are not separate from human rights. Like other peoples, indigenous peoples are also entitled to enjoy two normative sets of rights: a) to freely determine political status; and b) to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. However, how these rights will be implemented stand out as a big challenge. One of the big challenges is that many States tend to interpret indigenous self-determination as a threat to territorial integrity and sovereignty.
Contrary to the statist view, indigenous peoples interpret their right to self-determination as the right “that gives them the right to be in control of their own lives and their own destiny” (Henricksen, 2001:14). In other words, indigenous self-determination does not necessarily mean secession or independence, rather it is a right by which indigenous peoples can gain greater control over own lives and destiny. 

2.4 the indigenous right to self-DETERMINATION: example of practices

The UNDRIP (Article 4) provides mechanisms for implementing the indigenous right to self-determination through either autonomy or self-government. In practice, how autonomy or self-government has been operationalised is examined below.
Many States across the world have implemented autonomy or self-government arrangements for indigenous peoples. These measures were laid down in the State’s constitution or the treaties between the States and indigenous peoples. For example, the Indian constitutions in its Sixth Schedule makes provisions for autonomous states, and where applicable, Autonomous Districts Councils (ADCs) for the ‘tribal people’ in the states of Tripura, Meghalaya, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh (Roy, 2009). While in many countries of the world, indigenous peoples have signed treaties or accords with the States. Within the frameworks of those treaties, indigenous peoples have been enjoying the right to exercise self-determination through self-governments, for example, the Treaty of Waitangi of 1840 in New Zealand and the Self-government Agreement of 1991 with indigenous Inuit people of Nunavut in Canada.     
By examining the nature of autonomy and self-government practices in Asia, Europe and the Artic region, Henricksen (2001:18) has identified four types of indigenous autonomy. These are: (1) autonomy through contemporary indigenous political institutions, such as the Sami Parliaments in the Nordic countries; (2) indigenous territorial based autonomy, such as the Comarca arrangement in Panama; (3) regional autonomy within the States, e.g. autonomous indigenous regions in the Philippines; and (4) indigenous overseas autonomy e.g. the Greenland Home Rule arrangement.

2.5 summary

Until the establishment of the United Nations, the concept of self-determination was a ‘principle’ to be free from imperialism or foreign domination. The UN in its Charter formally recognised this ‘principle’ to establish friendly relations between the States.
Subsequently, the principle of self-determination has turned into a ‘right’ through the adoption of ICCPR and IESCR. The right to self-determination has two aspects – external, which relates to freely determining political status; and other one is internal self-determination related to freely pursuing own economic, social and cultural development.  
However, implementation of self-determination has been very contentious, as many States tend to question the indigenous people’s eligibility to be as ‘peoples’ and concerns over territorial integrity. Whereas indigenous peoples claim that they are “peoples” in all aspects of self-determination, and hence equally with other “peoples”, indigenous peoples also are eligible for right to self-determination. Therefore, their claim legally has been endorsed by the UNDRIP.
Yet implementation of the right to self-determination of indigenous peoples has been a big challenge, because the establishment of an effective national mechanism on indigenous self-determination largely depends on the ‘will’ of the States. Without political ‘will’ and support from the States the implementation of the indigenous people’s right to self-determination is almost impossible.
According to Henricksen, the right of self-determination is not a “pre-determined outcome” but it is a “process right”. Thus it follows that the right of self-determination has to be individually defined through a process of dialogue between the States and indigenous peoples concerned, provided that both parties can sit together with mutual respect and trust to each other.
By drawing on Henricksen’s view, it can be said that the Bangladesh government and indigenous peoples of CHT reached an agreement through dialogues. In this situation, there arise of couple of questions: how the indigenous leaders of CHT have conceptualised their right to self-determination in Bangladesh? How much the Bangladesh government is respectful to implement the CHT Accord towards ensuring the indigenous people’s right to self-determination? 

  
Section 3: the indigenous people’s quest for the right of self-determination in CHT
This section examines the roots causes of the indigenous people’s movement for the right of self-determination in CHT, Bangladesh. In essence, the struggle for the right of self-determination in CHT has emerged from the fact that the successive regimes – from the British rules to the present Bangladesh – progressively denied indigenous peoples of their rights to self-rule and identity. To explain this argument, this section provides brief information indigenous peoples and their identities followed by an analysis of the states policies towards indigenous peoples of CHT.      

3.1 indigenous peoples and identities 

CHT is a home to eleven indigenous peoples namely Chakma, Marma, Tripura, Tanchangya, Murong, Bawm, Chak, Khumi, Khyang, Lushai, Pangkhua other than the Bengalis. They are different from the majority Bengali populations in terms of physical appearances, languages, culture and religion. Even within indigenous groups, there are differences in various aspects. Among them Chakma, Marma and Tripura make up the majority with a population of 442,880 (90% of the total indigenous population), while numerically the most minority communities are the Chak (2000), Khumi (1241) and Lushai (662) (Jamil and Pandey, 2008, and Adnan, 2004). By religion, the Chakma, Marma, Tanchangya, and Chak are Buddhists, while Tripuras follow Hinduism. Other communities such as Bawm, Khyang, Khumi, Lushai and Pangkhua are Christian. The Murong retain the traditional beliefs, but are influenced by Buddhism (Adnan, 2004:11).
To identify them, several terms variously have been used. In the official documents, ‘tribal’ is widely written by the government officials to refer indigenous communities as a whole, while laws and policies pertaining to CHT used several terms such as ‘indigenous hillmen’, ethnic minority/adivasi (indigenous peoples) and ‘small ethnic groups’ for identifying them. In common parlance Pahari (hill people) is popularly used both by indigenous and non-indigenous people. Following a resurgence of indigenous movement in 1970s, jumma nation or jumma people was popularised by PCJSS to identify all indigenous peoples collectively in CHT (Van-schendel, 2001 and 1992). Out of shared history of oppression and common cultural traditions, jumma identity has created a renaissance among them into the protection of their own cultural distinctness and way of life which are different from the majority Bengalis.              

3.2 indigenous rights under different regimes 

3.2.1 the british colonial rules

The British colonisation has brought about major changes in the configuration of political power in CHT. In 1760, the British East India Company took over the charge of CHT, but it could not establish absolute authority without resistance. The Chakma King Jan Bux Khan challenged the Company’s authority over CHT. As a result, the British had to fight with the Chakma king for more than one decade from 1776 to 1787 to bring CHT region within their control. Finally, as the British imposed economic embargo on CHT, the Chakma King had to enter into a treaty of peace with the British Governor General in 1787 (Roy, 2000:40). Through this treaty, the colonial rule started in CHT.
Subsequently the colonial rulers adopted various means to consolidate their power over CHT. First, in 1860 they declared CHT as an autonomous administrative district to strengthen their supervisory authority over the region (Larma, 2003:1, Roy, 2000: 43). Second, to curtail the authority of the traditional kings the whole CHT was divided into three Circles under three indigenous rajas (kings) – the Chakma, the Bohmong and the Mong[6]. Third, they made a set of rules for the administration of CHT, e.g. the CHT Regulation I of 1900. This regulation, served two purposes for the colonial rulers. On one hand, under the CHT Regulation of 1900, they consolidated their power over all executive, judicial and financial matters in CHT (Van-Schendel, 1992; Adnan, 2004). On the other hand, it protected the interests of indigenous peoples by declaring CHT as an Excluded Area[7] (Roy, 2000). Although the British overlords (e.g. Deputy Commissioner) had the most powers than the traditional kings under the CHT Regulation 1900, they did not interfere with the internal indigenous affairs. This non-interference policy was continued by the British authorities until their departure in 1947.      

3.2.2 the pakistan rules 

With the departure of the British in 1947, CHT was ceded to Pakistan against the will of indigenous peoples. That time, almost 97% people were non-Muslims, for which indigenous leaders wanted to be included with India, which was more secular and democratic than Pakistan. Because of this support to India, from the very beginning the Pakistan regime treated CHT people, especially the Chakmas as “hostile elements and pro-Indians” (Uttaran, 1985: 36).
Eventually the Pakistan regime adopted a policy of depopulation to undermine the rights of indigenous peoples in CHT. As part of this policy, the Pakistan regime adopted two measures. First, it amended the legislations pertaining to CHT to remove all barriers for the Bengalis to enter CHT. For instance, by a constitutional amendment in 1962, the Pakistan regime replaced the CHT’s ‘Excluded Area’ status with ‘tribal area’. Then in 1964, the ‘tribal area’ status was completely scrapped off from the constitution. That means, CHT no longer remained an indigenous-inhabited area. The second measure was the resource appropriation e.g. the hydroelectric dam at Kaptai in 1960s in the rhetoric of ‘development in the national interest’ (Adnan, 2004: 23). By the hydroelectric project hundreds thousands of indigenous peoples were displaced from their ancestral lands. Simultaneously this development program attracted a large number of Bengali settlers from the plain land into CHT for jobs and business purposes. With continuous influx of Bengali settlers, cultural integrity, economy and existence of indigenous peoples had been threatened. These factors gave rise to a resistance movement since mid 1960s. 

3.2.3 the bangladesh rules 

Bangladesh became independent from Pakistan through a sanguinary war in 1971. In the aftermath of independence, the Bengali ruling elites considered Bangladesh as a ‘mono-national and mono-cultural’ state based on the ideology of Bengali nationalism (Chakma, 2010:287). This was corroborated in the first constitution of 1972, which subsumed ethnic diversities in Bangladesh. For example, Article 3 (Part I) of the constitution declared Bangla as the state language, without any reference to indigenous languages. By Article 6 (2) all citizens of Bangladesh were made “Bangalis” regardless of ethnic identities, religion and culture. That is, constitutionally all rights and distinct identities of indigenous peoples in CHT were completely denied by the nation state of Bangladesh
M.N Larma, then only indigenous Member of Parliament (MP) challenged such as a narrow state building approach. Being worried about the future of indigenous peoples, he made all possible efforts to get constitutional recognition of the rights and distinct identities of indigenous peoples in the newly independent Bangladesh’s constitution. As an MP, he tried to convince the house of parliament to include special provisions for indigenous peoples in the constitution, while the national constitution being drafted.
Simultaneously he represented to various policy-makers of the State. As part of this effort, an indigenous delegation led by M.N. Larma called on Sheikh Mujibar Rahman, the founder of Bangladesh, and for the first time they placed four point demands to him on 16 February 1972 for safeguarding indigenous rights in the constitution of Bangladesh (Uttaran, 1985; Larma, 2003; and Mohsin, 2003). The demands were:
(1)   Autonomy with own legislature for CHT;
(2)   A statutory provision similar to CHT Regulation 1900 in the constitution for the safeguard of indigenous peoples;
(3)   Retention of the administrative set up of the traditional kings (rajas); and
(4)   A constitutional guarantee not to make amendments on matters relating to the CHT without prior consent of indigenous peoples.  
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman rejected all the demands outright on the ground that autonomy and recognition of many distinct identities would not be possible in one country. Instead of listening to the delegation, he advised them to merge into the Bangalis:     
 No, we are all Bengalis. We cannot have two systems of government. Forget your ethnic identity, be Bengalis (CHTC, 1991:14).
Thus the State’s vehement rejection of the indigenous people’s demands compelled them to form own political party towards establishing own rights. Consequently PCJSS was formed under the leadership of M.N Larma, which launched an armed struggle against the government of Bangladesh (GoB) since 1976 onwards. 

3.3 indigenous people’s understanding of self-determination in cht 

The key literature reviewed on CHT issues demonstrates that indigenous leaders represented by PCJSS never claimed independence for CHT. Rather they aspired “to maintain their distinct national, cultural and ethnic identity and manifest in their own way” with the constitutional recognition (Uttaran, 1985:13). Hence, although it took resort to an armed struggle, PCJSS always kept the door open for a peaceful dialogue with the GoB.
As discussed in the foregoing sections, indigenous peoples had lost their political voice in the decision-making processes at the State level on one hand, and on the other hand, the safeguards of their rights completely had been ignored by the State. As such, PCJSS conceptualised the indigenous right to self-determination as means of regaining indigenous political voice and the safeguards of their rights in the constitution of Bangladesh. To achieve this objective, PCJSS tried to translate the right to self-determination into the Charter of Five-point demands, which was placed to the GoB in 1987 (PCJSS, 1987; Larma, 2003: 5). 
(1)         To accord Provincial Autonomy for the CHT with its own legislature;
(2)         To make constitutional provisions prohibiting any constitutional change regarding CHT without consent of the CHT people and preventing anyone from other parts of country from settling down in CHT;
(3)         To remove from CHT all those illegal outsiders who have infiltrated into CHT from 17 August 1947;
(4)         To make special economic plans for the development of the indigenous people of the CHT;
(5)         To create favourable climate for a peaceful and political solution of the crisis in the CHT.
Each of these demands has been detailed into other complimentary demands (see appendix A).  

3.4 the government’s response to the demand for the right to self-determination  

The GoB interpreted the five-point demands as contrary to the “unitary character” of the State (Anon., 1998). Consequently, the State considered the indigenous movement for autonomy as a threat to the sovereignty and independence of the country (Larma, 2003 and Chakma, 2010a). To respond the indigenous autonomy movement, the GoB adopted a good number measures, of them the three were most radical: militarisation; in-migration and Islamisation, which affected indigenous peoples adversely (Uttaran, 1985; Larma, 2003; Chakma, 2005 and Chakma, 2010 a).   
The Bangladesh government perceived a solution of the CHT from military security lens. As a result, the government increased the number of military forces in CHT. No actual official figures were available about the number of military forces; however, according to some sources, one soldier for every five to six indigenous persons (Levene, 1999 cited in Chakma, 2010:289), and one security force for every ten indigenous persons (CHT Commission, 1991:35) had been deployed for the period from 1982 to 1990. Besides the physical appearance of the military forces, the army also has control over civil affairs CHT.
In aid of the military forces, the government undertook population transfer program, which adversely affected indigenous people’s lives. According to PCJSS and CHT Commission (1994:26) sources, the government in three phases – 1st phase (1978 – 81), 2nd phase (1981 – 1982) and 3rd phase (1982 – 1984) brought more than 400,000 Bengali settlers from the plain districts into CHT. This population transfer program served the purpose of “ethnic cleansing” in two ways: eviction and land grabbing; and total extermination e.g. massacres jointly perpetrated by the army and settlers (Chakma, 2010a and 2010b). On one hand, being backed by the army and civil administration, the Bengali settlers forcefully occupied lands from indigenous villagers. On the other hand, the Bengali settlers and the military forces jointly carried out more than one dozen systematic massacres and communal attacks on indigenous peoples in between 1971 to 1993 (PCJSS, 2005; Chakma, 2010b). As a result, thousands of people, mostly indigenous, got killed and displaced from their ancestral lands. 
According to Chakma (2005) and Chakma (2010a), to encounter insurgency the Bangladesh government adopted Islamisation policy aimed at transforming CHT, the only non-Muslim area, into a Muslim dominant area (see table 1). In 1951, indigenous population comprises 90.91% against the 9.09% of the Bengali population. These figures drastically changed between 1981 and 1991, when indigenous population turned into nearly a minority in their own land. Interestingly, the recent 2001 Population Census does not include disaggregated data between indigenous and non-indigenous population. 
Table 1: population composition in CHT
Year
Indigenous
Bengali
Number
%
Number
%
1951
261538
90.91
26150
9.09
1956
300000
90.91
30000
9.09
1981
455000
61.07
290000
38.93
1991
501144
51.43
473301
48.57
Source: Adnan, 2004: 15
To sum up, the cumulative effects of these policies of the government had been so adverse that the lives and culture of indigenous peoples reached to a point of total extinction. Under these circumstances, indigenous peoples did not have alternative options but to fight with arms. After more than two decade-long armed fighting, the GoB negotiated with PCJSS for peace and that peace process culminated into a peace agreement on 2 December 1997 (see section 4).


 Section 4:Indigenous people’s right to self-determination and The CHT accord
The International Forum on Globalization, 2007, p. 15. 
This section examines the extent of autonomy, interchangeably the right to self-determination of indigenous peoples guaranteed in the CHT Accord. To elaborate the key issues of the right to self-determination in the context of CHT, this section discusses: the original demands of PCJSS for the right to self-determination and the reactions of the State; the rights guaranteed in the CHT Accord; and the obstacles to the implementation of the Accord.

4.1 Indigenous people’s demands: external or internal self-determination?

The indigenous movement emerged from the denial of indigenous rights by the successive regimes – from the colonial State to the present Bangladesh nation State (see section 3). To reclaim the right of self-determination, indigenous leaders made attempts to express their rights in different ways. However, they conceptualised it in concrete terms through the four-point demands in 1972, and then the elaborated charter of five-point demands in 1987 (see sections 3.2.3, 3.3 and appendix A). By looking at the four-point demands or the charter of five-point demands, no one could claim that even a single demand therein purported to declare independence or secession for CHT. Rather indigenous leaders demanded that their rights be guaranteed in the Bangladesh constitution. In other words, indigenous leaders of CHT sought the internal aspect of self-determination (see section 2.2 for the internal/external self-determination) to protect and maintain ‘national existence’ of indigenous peoples within the system of the State.    
While claiming the right to self-determination, indigenous leaders defend their position in several aspects. First, indigenous peoples of CHT have own distinct ‘national integrity and identities’, which are central to the “existence” of every ‘nation’. In other words, they argue that indigenous peoples, although numerically small nations, have the right to maintain own identities, languages and culture like the majority Bengalis. Second, the historical continuity of indigenous self-rule in CHT – from the British rule to the Pakistan rules indigenous peoples had self-rule system. But in the aftermath of independence, this historical context had been ignored in the statebuilding process of Bangladesh. Third, a desire to access the rights as citizens of the State, without discrimination (Wangza, 2010). In these political, historical, social, and cultural contexts, indigenous leaders strongly asserted that indigenous peoples would have to have a political voice in state affairs through democratic institutions, and those institutions would be vested with adequate power, which Lâm calls “state-like power” to freely pursue own economic, social and cultural development (see section 2.3.2). Hence, to achieve this goal, PCJSS initially demanded ‘provincial autonomy’ for CHT with a separate legislature.
The GoB did not accept the demand of provincial autonomy on the ground of the “unitary character” of the State. Consequently PCJSS was seen to revise its original five-point demands, in which it proposed ‘regional autonomy’ instead of ‘provincial autonomy’ to comply with the “unitary” character of Bangladesh (CHTC, 1991: 26). Obviously this positional shift of PCJSS to regional autonomy indicates that they intend to exercise their right to self-determination within the territory of Bangladesh vis-à-vis the Bangladesh constitution. To make autonomy meaningful, PCJSS stressed on a few issues such as constitutional recognition of indigenous identities, constitutional safeguard to prevent the influx of outsiders into CHT and a legislative guarantee not to amend or make laws with regards to CHT without the consent of indigenous peoples of CHT. They did not question the territorial integrity of Bangladesh, rather they believed that those demands were essential “to maintain their distinct national, cultural and ethnic identity and manifest in their own way” (Uttaran, 1985:13).
On the other hand, the right to self-determination being a universal human right, no States have the right to restrict its application for indigenous peoples. As such, international laws such as the ICCPR, IESCR and the recent UNDRIP unequivocally have authorised all peoples including indigenous peoples to exercise the right to self-determination in two aspects: to freely determine political status, and to freely pursue economic, social and cultural development. Bangladesh, being a member State of the UN, is bound to respect its indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination. If, on any ground either the ‘territorial integrity’ or the ‘unitary character’ of the state, Bangladesh makes any attempt to deprive its indigenous peoples from the right to self-determination, it would call a question to the legitimacy of UN human rights laws. Hence, the territorial integrity or the ‘unitary character’ of the State cannot stand as a barrier to the indigenous peoples’ enjoyment of the right to self-determination (Tanja, 2005).
However, still there are debates as to the ways of implementing this right. According to Henricksen, the right of self-determination is a “process right” rather than “pre-determined outcome” (see sections 2.4 and 2.5). Therefore, the bottom-line of this process is that self-determination individually has to be defined through a dialogue between the States and indigenous peoples concerned. In other words, the States’ pre-occupied idea of ‘independence’ or ‘secession’ cannot pave the way for solution to indigenous problems. Instead, by recognising the human rights of all human beings, the appropriate political or institutional arrangements have to be agreed upon between the State and indigenous peoples through peaceful and respectful negotiation. In this respect, UNDRIP (Article 4 of UNDRIP) have provided for mechanisms to implement the right to self-determination through “autonomy” or “self-government”, without entering into ‘independence’ or ‘secession’ debates.
In the case of CHT, indigenous leaders also persistently emphasised ‘autonomy’ towards establishing their right to self-determination within the boundary of Bangladesh. Accordingly, they negotiated with the successive governments from 1985 to 1997.  Finally, this peaceful political dialogue culminated into the CHT Peace Accord on 2 December 1997 between the GoB and PCJSS. Thus through signing the CHT Accord, the GoB has accepted the demand of regional autonomy for indigenous peoples in CHT.           

4.2 The Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the CHT Accord

After many rounds of talks[8] between the GoB and PCJSS, the representative indigenous political party, finally a peace deal, commonly known as the CHT Peace Accord was reached by both parties on 2 December 1997. With the signing of the CHT Accord, indigenous peoples of CHT have been able to re-establish partial regional autonomy/semi autonomous self-government (Islam, 2003 and Roy, 2004b). Under the framework of regional autonomy, the CHT Accord has addressed many of the indigenous people’s rights with regards their political representation; control over economic, social and cultural development through the special governance institutions under indigenous leadership; and the protection of land rights. The key features of these rights have been discussed in the subsequent sections. 

4.2.1 Recognition of cultural distinctness of indigenous peoples

As discussed in section 3, indigenous peoples of CHT are different from the majority Bengalis in terms of ethnic identities, language, culture and religion. Hence, in order to protect the interests of indigenous peoples, the British and the Pakistani rulers had to retain the special administrative and legal status of CHT under the nomenclature of “excluded area” and “tribal area”. But after independence, in the statebuilding process of Bangladesh, the new ‘Bengali rulers’ callously ignored this historical context of self-rule system and ethnic identities of indigenous peoples in CHT. Constitutionally Bangladesh has been made a ‘mono-national and mono-cultural’ state (see section 3.2.3). Against such an assimilationist approach to statebuilding, one of the PCJSS’s objectives was to gain constitutional safeguards for the rights and identities of indigenous peoples with autonomy for CHT. To this end, PCJSS demanded CHT would be recognised as “Jumma Land” (see 1 (F) in appendix A). It meant that constitutionally CHT would be a territory inhabited by indigenous peoples within the boundary of Bangladesh.
The demand of “Jumma Land” proposed by PCJSS has not been achieved, however, the CHT Accord has recognised CHT as a “tribal inhabited region” (The CHT Accord 1997: Part A). For indigenous peoples, the ‘tribal’ identity is rather derogatory. Nonetheless, by declaring CHT a “tribal inhabited region”, the GoB in principle, has agreed to the need of preserving the distinct culture, language and identities of indigenous peoples of CHT.

4.2.2 Political representation of indigenous peoples

To gain a political voice, indigenous leaders demanded ‘provincial autonomy’ with separate legislature, but it was not possible without constitutional amendment. Hence, they revised this demand to ‘regional autonomy’, in which they proposed three hill districts of CHT would be brought under a political and administrative unit and be administered by a ‘regional council (RC)’ constituted with elected representatives (Mohsin, 2003). They demanded that the RC would be competent to deal with all affairs related to CHT except defence, foreign affairs, currency and heavy industry (see sub-section 1(D) of Five-point demands in appendix A). Although all demands of the PCJSS’ five-point charter have not been achieved, the CHT Accord has established three special governance structures to ensure indigenous people’s political participation in state affairs. These institutions are: the Ministry on CHT affairs, CHT Regional Council (CHTRC) and a Hill District Council (HDC) in each of three hill districts in CHT. Headed by indigenous persons all these institutions have been entrusted with substantial power and responsibilities to deal with local development matters including general administration, law and order and indigenous culture and social justice. Obviously through these institutions, indigenous peoples have achieved a political voice to have their say in the decision-making stages at local and national levels. The remainder of this section examines the power and functions of these institutions and how much they are capable to freely determine own affairs for the well-being of indigenous peoples in CHT.

a. the ministery of chittagong hill tracts affairs 

The CHT Accord (Article 19 of Part D) has provides for a Ministry on CHT affairs (MoCHTA) headed by an indigenous person. As per the Rules of Business, the MoCHTA has 19 functions (see appendix B). However, its main role is to supervise and coordinate overall development matters and administrative activities of CHT region.  
At the national level, the MoCHTA has a crucial role to play for the greater interest of people in CHT. As a focal point of CHT region, it coordinates with other line ministries of the government and provides advisory support to the central government with regards to matters of CHT. It also has a role in making law on CHT issues. While at the regional level, the MoCHTA monitors and coordinates overall development activities undertaken by the CHT institutions such as the CHTRC and three HDCs, and other local government bodies. 
However, according to the AITPN study (2008), in respect of development and administrative responsibility, the authority of the MoCHTA over other government line agencies and local government bodies like Upazila (sub-district) and Union Councils (the lowest tier of local governance) is not clear; because these administrative units are directly guided by their respective Ministries in Dhaka. As a result, the co-ordination and supervisory authority of the MoCHTA remains unconfirmed and unrealised.

b. the chittagong hill tracts regional council

Recognising CHT region as a ‘unique political and administrative unit’ the CHT Accord provides for the establishment of the CHT Regional Council with an objective to coordinate and supervise the activities of the three Hill District Councils (HDCs) and other government institutions in three hill districts of CHT. The CHTRC is constituted with 22 members, of them 12 members including 2 female members are from indigenous communities and the rest are non-indigenous members. The position of the chair is reserved for indigenous person, who will enjoy the status of a Minister-of-the State. In addition, the chairpersons of three HDCs are also ex-officio members of the CHTRC (Article 3, Part C of the CHT Accord). In a word, substantial political representation of all indigenous communities has been ensured in the CHTRC along with non-indigenous people.  
As an apex political and administrative body of CHT, the CHTRC is entrusted with specific power and functions. According to CHTRC Act 1998, the CHTRC has a mandate to coordinate and supervise all activities of three HDCs, general civil administration and law and order, and all other development activities/programs undertaken by the autonomous body and NGOs in CHT (see appendix B). Other functions include issuing license for heavy industry, disaster management and coordination of traditional and social justice.
The CHTRC does not have legislative power, although this was one of the most sought-after political demands of indigenous leaders. However, the CHTRC has an advisory role with regards to making any laws for CHT region (Article 53 of CHTRC Act 1998). It can provide recommendations to the central government in two ways: a) it can request the government to amend any law, which might have adverse effects on the development of CHT and well-being of indigenous people; and b) it may recommend making a new law, if necessary, for CHT region. On the other hand, the central government also has a prerogative to consult the CHTRC before making any law concerning CHT region.
The CHTRC’s “supervisory jurisdiction” applies not only to HDCs, but also extends over to the general administration and local government bodies of CHT (Roy, 2004a: 126). In other words, the CHTRC is expected to be the final authority with regards to development and administration in CHT. In practice, due to lack of political support and absence of subsidiary regulations and guidelines, the CHTRC has not been able to exercise its full authority over CHT (ibid).  

c. the hill district councils

Within the framework of the CHT Accord, the Hill District Councils (HDCs) have been established in each of three hill districts namely Rangamati, Khagrachari and Bandarban of CHT. These HDCs have more control over economic, social and cultural development in that they have the authority over a good number of subjects/departments which would be delegated to them by the central government, such as health, education, agriculture, culture, land management, commerce and trade and so on. 
The composition of ethnic representation in the HDCs differs from each (see table 2), however each HDC is chaired by an indigenous person. Representation from all eleven indigenous communities including the Bengalis has been ensured in HDCs. Each councillor of the HDCs directly would be elected by the people.  The chairpersons of HDCs enjoy the rank and status and the privileges of a Deputy Minister of the government (ADB, 2001). 
Table 2: the composition of the HDCs
HDCs
Chair (indigenous)
Councillors
Total
Indigenous
Bengalis
Rangmati HDC
1
22
11
34
Khagrachari HDC
1
23
10
34
Bandarban HDC
1
21
12
34
Source: HDC Acts, 1998 (Rangamati, Khagrachari and Bandarban)
To determine own economic, social and cultural development, Article 22 (HDC Act, 1998) provides that the central government would delegate authority to every HDCs over a total of 33 subjects and departments of the public services (see appendix B). Among the transferable subjects by the central government, the most important ones are education, mainly primary and adult education; health; agriculture and forestry; livestock; fisheries; cooperatives; commerce and industries; social welfare; culture; land and land management; development planning; local police; indigenous custom, tradition and social justice system; and jum (shifting) cultivation and so forth. Above all, HDCs are responsible for supervision, coordination and monitoring of the development activities carried out by local authorities. They are also responsible for supervision and maintenance of the law and order situation in respective district. 
For the development in the respective district, the HDCs can prepare and implement development with own resources or funds from the central government (Article 42 of HDC Acts 1998). On the other hand, the central government also may formulate and implement development plans through the HDCs.

Like the CHTRC, the HDCs do not have power to make any law on any issues for respective district. However, if any law passed by the national parliament is found to be harmful for the interest of indigenous people in the respective district, the HDCs can write to the central government by explaining the problems (Article 79 of HDC Act, 1998). On the basis of their recommendations, the central government may take measure to amend or relax the application of that law in CHT.  
In short, the HDCs appear to be the most powerful institutions in terms of delivering administrative functions and social, economic and cultural development for indigenous peoples including the Bengalis in CHT region. However, in practice, these institutions have not been empowered yet by the central government to exercise their full authority in respective district. 

4.3 protection of land rights of indigenous peoples

As discussed in section 3, the land alienation process of indigenous peoples started with colonisation. This problem was exacerbated during the Pakistani rules by constructing the Kaptai Hydro electric dam. By the dam, hundred thousands indigenous peoples were displaced from ancestral lands, and 40% of total fertile land went under water. The Bangladeshi regimes made the situation worst by bringing thousands of thousands Bengali settlers into CHT from the plains (see section 3.3). With the full backing from both the civil and military administration, those Bengali settlers grabbed lands from indigenous people. This factor led to the violent conflicts and serious human rights violation upon indigenous people across CHT.           
In such situation, one of the PCJSS’s objectives was to re-gain control over lands. To achieve this objective PCJSS demanded to stop the influx of the Bengali settlers into CHT, and withdrawal of all settlers who already settled in CHT illegally (see the point 3 in appendix A). Therefore, to settle the land problems and thereby to protect the indigenous land rights, the CHT Accord has included a number of measures. 
First, delegation of authority to the HDCs authority over land and land management in respective district. The HDCs have the power to restrict land transfer i.e. no lands in CHT except the land of the public institutions as specified in the Accord, would be transferred in any forms such as lease, settlement, purchase or sale to anyone or institutions without “prior approval” of the HDC concerned (Article 64 of HDC Act 1998). Here the “prior approval” condition is the most important aspect for protecting indigenous people’s right to land. Moreover, the HDCs have the power to supervise and control the functions of lower-tier land and revenue administration officials[9] such as Headmen, Chainmen, Amins, Surveyors, Kanungos and Assistant Commissioners (land).
Secondly, the CHT Accord also provides for a Land Commission to settle the disputes over land ownership in CHT (Article 4, Part D of the CHT Accord). The Land Commission will be constituted with a retired judge of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, while the three traditional administrative chiefs, locally called rajas (kings), a representative of the CHTRC, and the chairperson of the HDCs will be the member of the Land Commission. The Commission has a mandate to follow the laws, customs and conventions prevailing in the CHT, while adjudicating the cases of land disputes between the indigenous peoples and the Bengali settlers. In other words, indigenous members in their capacities will be competent to advise the Land Commission on matters of customary systems of land and resource management, while resolving the land disputes.       
Thirdly, the CHT Accord provides for the measures to redeem the lands from outsiders by cancelling leases (Article 8, Part D of the CHT Accord). It is notable that before signing the CHT Accord, a large of number of non-resident people from the plains took common lands on lease in the name of rubber and other commercial plantation in CHT. The CHT Accord has authorised the CHT institutions to cancel all the leases if the lands, which remain unutilised for ten years. At the same, the CHT Accord provides for ensuring land ownership to landless indigenous families by 2 acres for each family.       
In sum, the CHT Accord has provided for a potential to protect the land rights of indigenous peoples in CHT, but the achievement of better outcome will depend upon the functional dynamics of the indigenous led institutions such as the CHTRC, HDCs and the Land Commission. 

4.4 the obstacles to the implementation of the accord

In the preamble the Accord states its objective as to “uphold the political, social, cultural, educational and economic rights” of all people and to expedite the social and economic development in CHT. But in 13 years of the Accord, this objective seems to be a far cry for indigenous peoples as the implementation of the Accord has been stalled. There are many factors behind it, however, the following are considered to be most crucial.   
Lack of political commitment: Although the CHT Accord was signed with too much enthusiasm, the successive governments did not show respect in implementation of the Accord in letter and spirit. Even the Awami League (AL) government, as a signatory party to the Accord, during its tenure (1996 – 2001) did not undertake effective measures for implementation of the Accord. Then the next BNP-led government (2001 – 2006), which was vehemently against the CHT Accord, did not take any tangible measures for implementation of the Accord (Jamil and Pandey, 2008). Larma (2003:9) attributes the total non-implementation of the Accord to the “chauvinistic mentality” of the Bengali Muslim ruling elite, intelligentsia and bureaucrats. 
Non-devolution of power to the Hill Councils: this is also associated with lack of political will of the government. The Hill Councils - the CHTRC and HDCs were established with indigenous leadership, but no government, since signing the Accord, did take effective legislative and administrative measures for devolution of authority to these Hill Councils. As a result, to-date the CHTRC cannot play its full authority “to supervise, monitor and coordinate” all activities of the HDCs, general administration, and local government bodies in CHT (Roy, 2004a). While the HDCs also have not been empowered to look after the 33 subjects of the public services such as health, agriculture, education, land and land management, police (local) and so on towards ensuring overall social and economic development for indigenous peoples.
The root of conflict remains unaddressed: One of the root causes of conflict was the Bengali settlers, who were brought into CHT under the government-sponsorship in order to minoritise indigenous peoples in their lands (see section 3.4). Withdrawal of these Bengali settlers directly had not been addressed in the CHT Accord. It was reported that, the issue being politically too sensitive the government refused to put it in writing in the agreement, but it “verbally” promised to indigenous leaders into resettling the Bengali settlers outside CHT (CHTC, 2000: 14). However, the government denied any such verbal agreement. Resettlement and land grabbing by the Bengali settlers continue at large even in the post-Accord situation. As a result, very frequently there erupts violent conflict between indigenous people and the Bengali settlers.
Militarisation: The Accord provides for demilitarisation of CHT through withdrawal of all temporary military garrisons except six cantonments in CHT. This commitment has not been implemented yet. Instead a new military rule, called the Operation Uttoron (upliftment), has been imposed in CHT in the post-Accord situation. This military rule has allowed the army to control the functions of the general civil administration, law and order, and development work such as construction roads on one hand, and on the other, it continues to actively support the Bengali settlers under the “Shantakaran” (Pacification) and “Ashrayan” (shelter) projects (Larma, 2003:10). Even in the post-Accord period, PCJSS, a party to the Accord and local indigenous people on many occasions alleged the army’s role to let loose the Bengali settlers upon the indigenous villages in CHT, such as the recent violence happened on 25 February 2010 in Rangmati district, where 6 indigenous villagers got killed and 25 injured (Chakma, 2010a, and AI, 2010). In a word, the military interference in CHT affairs is still a serious threat to the implementation of the CHT Accord.  

Section 5:
--> challenges in implementation of indigenous self-determination in Bangladesh
This section briefly discusses the possible challenges in implementation of the indigenous people’s right to self-determination. To implement the right to self-determination involves two aspects – legal and political. From the legal aspect, it is a universal human right for all peoples recognized by international law. Bangladesh as a member State of the UN cannot deprive its indigenous peoples from the right to self-determination on any ground either in the name of ‘unitary character’ or ‘territorial integrity’ of the State. On other hand, to translate self-determination into action at national level is a political exercise, which Henricksen calls a “process right” that has to be defined individually through negotiation between the State and indigenous peoples concerned. As such, many States are seen implementing indigenous self-determination through alternative political arrangements such as ‘autonomy’ or ‘self-government’ for (see 2.4 in Section 2). Bangladesh too through negotiation with indigenous leaders accorded partial regional autonomy for indigenous peoples in CHT. However, still there are many challenges ahead to implement indigenous rights in Bangladesh. A few of them have been discussed below. 
First, to-date recognition of distinct culture, language and identities of indigenous peoples has remained unresolved in the Bangladesh constitution. In protest of imposing the ‘Bengali nationalism’ on indigenous peoples by the first constitution of ’72, the PCJSS launched movement and later took up arms for the right of autonomy for CHT (see 3.2.3 in section 3). That time, the Bengali ruling elites did not accept PCJSS’ demand on the plea of ‘unitary character’ of the state (Article 1 of the Bangladesh Constitution). But as of now, the unitary character of the state has not changed i.e. no single word has been inserted in the constitution in favour of indigenous people. In this respect, it is notable that already the CHT Accord had been challenged in the Bangladesh High Court. The High Court in its primary verdict on 13 April 2010 declared some sections of HDCs Act 1998 and the CHTRC Act 1998 as the contradictory to the “sanctity of the unitary state” (The New Age, 13 April 2010). Now, the case is under the review at the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court. 
Second, the Bangladesh government policy on indigenous issues is very clear – it always has been denying the existence of indigenous peoples. At the UN level, the Bangladesh was seen to raise voice against the indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination, while the UNDRIP being drafted (Lam, 2000:64). Thus Bangladesh states its position on indigenous issues - “the country has some tribal populations, and there are no indigenous peoples”[10]. Last January 2010, the government through the MoCHTA asked the local authorities in CHT into taking action to prevent using the term ‘indigenous’ in lieu of ‘tribal’ (Chakma, 2010). By denying the existence of ‘indigenous peoples’, Bangladesh tends to deny their rights to self-determination at national level. 
Third, the CHT Accord has not been protected with constitutional safeguard. So, if any political government in power does not want to keep it, it can scrap off the Accord through a simple majority in the parliament. 
Fourth, although the CHT Accord ended the long-standing armed conflict in CHT region, the implementation process now has been stalled due to various reasons such as lack of political support, non-devolution of power and military interference (see 4.2.4 in Section 4). Therefore, it appears that implementation of the rights in the CHT Accord largely will depend upon political will of the ruling party or friendly political relations between the central government and indigenous led CHT institutions – the CHTRC and HDCs.   
Fifth, the CHT institutions namely the CHTRC and HDCs under indigenous leadership do not have power to make any laws or policies, although the central government has a prerogative to “consult” with them before making any laws with regards to CHT and indigenous people (see 4.2.2 in Section 4).  On the other hand, the CHTRC and HDCs may make recommendations on any legislation to the central government. In case the central government does not respect their recommendations, these hill councils do not have veto power to stop implementing any law or programs against the will of the indigenous peoples.  




 Section 6:
--> conclusion
The struggle of indigenous peoples in CHT under the leadership of PCJSS since 1970s onwards demonstrates that indigenous peoples can take resort to the armed resistance if their right to self-determination is denied by the nation State. The indigenous peoples’ struggle is deeply rooted into the past history of self-rule and the aspiration to maintain own culture, languages and identities. The case of CHT, Bangladesh, shows that the national integration project based on the mono-national paradigm cannot go unchallenged if the indigenous people’s history, language and cultural diversity are not taken into account during the statebuilding process.
Indigenous peoples of CHT once were independent under the leadership of traditional kings. Their rights had been diminished with colonisation, but the colonial rulers could not deny the indigenous self-rule system completely. Accordingly the Pakistan regimes also had to maintain the indigenous self-rule system to some extent. But after independence of Bangladesh, the new Bengali rulers completely overlooked the indigenous people’s history, self-rule system, culture, language and distinct identities in the name of national integration. Without any consideration to other’s ethnic identities, the Bangladeshi rulers imposed Bengali nationalism on indigenous peoples. This assimilitationist approach to statebuilding of Bangladesh threatened language, culture and identities of indigenous peoples of CHT.
Against the Bengali nationalism, indigenous leaders invented jumma nationalism to assert the right to self-determination of different indigenous ‘nations’ in CHT. Under the banner of own political party, PCJSS, they pushed their demand to the GoB for the right to self-determination, interchangeably autonomy with own legislation. Out of the paradigmatic conception of statebuilding, the newly independent Bangladesh denied outright the indigenous people’s right to autonomy on the plea of the ‘unitary character’ of the state. Instead of paying attention to the indigenous people’s demand, the state labelled the indigenous movement for autonomy as a “threat to the sovereignty and independence”. Consequently, to suppress the indigenous autonomy movement, the State undertook repressive measures against indigenous peoples.
From the human rights perspective, the right to self-determination is a universal human right applicable for all peoples including indigenous peoples. This right is recognised in international law such as ICCPR, IESCR and UNDRIP. The adoption of the UNDRIP by the UN exclusively for indigenous peoples clearly gives a message that every State is bound to respect the indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination. But many States tend to interpret the right to self-determination from decolonisation context vis-à-vis secession or independence. From that perspective, they deny the indigenous people’s right to self-determination. In contrast to the state-centric view, indigenous peoples view self-determination as a fundamental collective human right which is essential for them to be in control of their own lives and destiny. So, they want such right by which they can freely determine own political arrangements and pursue economic, social and cultural development towards full enjoyment of their human rights. To achieve this goal, it does not necessarily involve secession or independence, but the right to self-determination has to be defined through mutual negotiation between the State and indigenous peoples concerned.        
The same was with the case of CHT, Bangladesh, where indigenous peoples did not claim independence. Rather indigenous leaders conceptualised their understanding of self-determination in terms of ‘regional autonomy’ within the national constitution. They wanted an authentic self-government within the constitutional framework of Bangladesh, through which they wished to determine own affairs, especially land rights, social and cultural rights. But due to very unilingual and unicultural system of the state, indigenous people’s voice remained unattended.
Consequently indigenous leadership i.e. the PCJSS had no other alternative options but to assert their rights with arms against the government. Despite the PCJSS took up arms, it always was open to dialogue for a peaceful and political solution to the indigenous problems in CHT. On the other hand, the GoB tried to solve the political problem through military means, but it could not bring any positive outcome from the fight against the indigenous insurgents for more than two decades.       
Finally, the GoB had to recognise the importance of dialogue to negotiate about the rights of indigenous peoples. This realisation of the GoB has resulted in a peace agreement, known as the CHT Accord between the State and indigenous people in 1997. Through signing the Accord, the State has recognised the political voice and economic, social and cultural demands of indigenous peoples. To accommodate indigenous participation in the state affairs, the GoB established special governance structures such as the special ministry, CHTRC, and HDCs with indigenous leadership.
Despite these institutional arrangements for indigenous people, indigenous leadership has not been able yet to fully exercise their authority to determine own affairs in CHT. A good number of factors are responsible for it; however, the major ones are lack of political support, non-devolution of power to local authorities, policies of militarization, and minoritisation of indigenous peoples. Above all, the ‘unitary’ character of the state has not changed, for which the State denies the existence of its indigenous peoples in order to deprive them from their rights to self-determination interchangeably autonomy. This fact is reflected in the non-implementation of the CHT Accord.
In sum, it is interesting to note that, on one hand, from human rights perspective the right to self-determination is a universal human right for all peoples, including indigenous peoples. All States are bound to implement it. On the other hand, Bangladesh denies its indigenous peoples existence and their right to self-determination on the ground of the “unitary character” of the state, which is contradictory to the international human rights norms and principles.  Therefore, the future research could examine the extent of the ‘unitary character’ of the Bangladesh state in the light of international human rights law.




Footnotes
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1.      Several terms such as ‘tribal’, ‘hill men’, and ‘jumma people’ are used to refer indigenous peoples in CHT. In official documents, the term ‘tribal’ is widely used, which is derogatory for indigenous groups. Against the tribal identity, during1970s political activists constructed the term jumma (hill people, who used to practice jum (swidden) agriculture) to unite all indigenous communities in CHT. By contrast, many laws and policies pertaining to CHT, such as the CHT Peace Accord 1997 and CHT Regulation I of 1900 variably used the terms ‘tribal’ and ‘indigenous hillmen’ to refer all indigenous peoples in CHT, while the national Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) of 2005, 2008 and 2009 used the terms ‘indigenous people’ and ‘ethnic minority/adivasi’ to refer all indigenous groups in Bangladesh including that of CHT as a whole. During the Bengali term ‘adivasi’ (indigenous peoples) has been popularised to identify all indigenous peoples in Bangladesh as a whole. To avoid the identity debate, the term ‘indigenous peoples’ or ‘communities’ is used in this paper.  
2.       PCJSS (Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti, meaning the Chittagong Hill Tracts united people’s party) is an indigenous political party formed in 1973. It waged guerrilla war against the government of Bangladesh for autonomy in CHT.
3.      The British government enacted a regulation in 1900 (known as CHT Regulation 1900) exclusively for the administration of CHT. By this Regulation, CHT was given a status of ‘Excluded Area’, by which non-residents were not allowed to buy land and settle permanently in CHT.   
4.      The article 6 (2) of the Bangladesh constitution 1972 reads that “all citizens of Bangladesh shall be known as Bangalis”.   
5.      Initially it was known as Gana Mukti Fouj (people’s liberation army). Later it came to be known as Shanti Bahini (peace forces) due to its popularity among the mass people in CHT.
6.      In 1884, the CHT was divided into three Circles (traditional administrative unit) - Chakma Circle, Bohmong Circle and Mong Circle. Each of these Circles is named after the community and headed by a traditional chief, locally called raja (king). Each Circle consists of two lower units called mouza followed by villages.
7.      By applying the policy of exclusion in the form of ‘Excluded Area’ status, the British rulers restricted outsiders to buy land and settle permanently in CHT in order to protect indigenous peoples from economic exploitation, on one hand; they did not allow indigenous people to participate in the democratic governance, and decision-making process on state affairs, on the other.    
8.      PCJSS negotiated with the successive governments from 1985 to 1997. From 1985 to 1988, the military-backed Ershad government held six rounds of talks with PCJSS. Then the BNP and the Awami League governments respectively held 13 rounds of talks from 1992 and 1995, and 6 rounds of talks from 1996 to 1997.
9.      Except Headmen, other officials are appointed by the government and responsible for preparing land documents, maps, collecting revenue, survey and demarcation, and land transfer. Headmen are the traditional leaders, who are responsible for keeping land records, collection of revenue and certification of land ownership in case of land transfer, at local level. 
10.  On 19 August 2008, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a notice to the Ministry of CHT Affairs on the Bangladesh’s position with regards to indigenous issues, vide memo No: UN-GA-4220/08, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the UN Branch.     
 


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Thursday, December 2, 2010

PEACEBUILDING IN CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS, BANGLADESH: PROCESSES AND REALITIES

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in the south-east of Bangladesh had been conflict torn for about three decades from 1970s to 1990s. Historically the CHT region is a home to eleven indigenous peoples, who are ethnically and culturally different from the Bengalis. Once the CHT region was independently administered by the traditional rajas (kings), but their authority had been curtailed through the arrival of the British colonial rulers (Larma, 2003; Roy, 2004). However, indigenous peoples of CHT always had the right to maintain own self-rule system. But in the aftermath of independence of Bangladesh in 1971, the Bengali ruling elites did not accept the indigenous people’s self-rules system and identities in the constitution (Chakma, 2005).
 
Jyotirindra Bodhipriya (Santu) Larma (right) handing over arm to Sheikh Hasina, Prime Minister of Bangladesh (left), 1997
Photo: the daily Kaler Kontha

On this backdrop, indigenous leaders in 1972 came up with a demand of autonomy for CHT to safeguard their rights, but this demand was categorically rejected by the newly independent Bangladesh. Under these circumstances, an indigenous political party PCJSS was formed under the leadership of MN Larma, then only indigenous MP, to achieve autonomy for indigenous peoples in CHT. As the PCJSS persisted with autonomy, the state responded to it through the repressive measures, which ultimately served the purpose of ‘ethnic cleansing’ against the indigenous peoples in CHT (Chakma, 2010a). In response to the state’s repressive measures, the PCJSS took up arms against the government since 1976 onwards. Since then it continued a guerrilla war against the government of Bangladesh (GoB) until 2 December 1997, when an agreement, popularly known as the CHT Peace Accord (PA) was reached between the government of Bangladesh (GoB) and the PCJSS, by ending the long-standing armed conflict and bloodshed in CHT.

According to Jeong (2005:5) in the post-conflict situation “implementation of the peace agreements may not necessarily be linear or orderly, and may not even guarantee an expected outcome”. This is true with the case of the PA of CHT, which is now beset with many problems. Since singing the PA, more than one decade has passed away without much progress in implementation of the PA. The PCJSS, a party to the PA blames the GoB for lack of its sincerity to implement the peace deal (Larma, 2003). Along with non-implementation of the PA, serious human rights violations on indigenous people such as communal attacks, land grabbing, killing and rapes have been reported by the PCJSS in the post-accord period. The recent violent attack added to the list of human rights violation was the Baghaihat communal attack jointly committed by the Bengali settlers and the military forces upon the indigenous villages last February 2010 in Rangamati, one of the three hill districts in CHT. In that conflict, six people got killed, and 25 injured (ACHR, 2010). Following this incident, Chakma (2010 b:19) comments that the recent violent conflict in Baghaihat is not an “isolated event” rather the latest development of the long-running saga of violence, and such kind of violent attacks on indigenous peoples will occur in the days to come until the structural roots of violent conflict remain unresolved.

In the aforementioned context, it is relevant to ask questions: how the conflicts have been resolved to establish peace in CHT, Bangladesh? To what extent the PA has been able to address the roots of structural violence? In order to answer these questions, I shall examine a) the root-causes of the violent conflicts; b) how the peace process was initiated and which actors were involved in the said process; and c) what were priorities of the PA towards establishing peace.

In this paper, I shall argue that the PA has ended the long-standing armed conflict, but it fails to bring lasting peace in CHT. The failures substantially result from two factors: lack of political commitment of the government to implement the PA; and absence of appropriate mechanisms within the framework of the PA to address the roots of structural violence in CHT.

2.0 HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT IN CHT

There are multiple factors behind the conflict of CHT, Bangladesh. However, the roots cause of conflict in CHT could be attributed to the continual denial of indigenous self-rule system by the successive regimes. But the violent conflict came to the surface in the aftermath of independence in 1971, when the new Bengali ruling elites completely ignored the indigenous rights and distinct identities during the statebuilding process of Bangladesh.

The political history of CHT has a bearing on the CHT conflict. Before the colonial rules, the traditional rajas (kings) ruled CHT region without external interference (Larma, 2003; Roy, 2004). With the annexation of CHT with the British colony the traditional rajas lost their freedom; however the colonial rulers maintained autonomous administrative status of CHT through legislative measures. For instance, in 1900 the British regime enacted a regulation called the ‘Chittagong Hill Tracts Regulation I of 1900’ exclusively for the administration of CHT. Under this regulation, CHT was given a status of ‘Excluded Area’, by which the colonial rulers restricted outsiders from buying land and settling down permanently in CHT in order to protect indigenous peoples from economic exploitation. At the same time, they did not interfere with the internal affairs of indigenous peoples till their departure from the Indian sub-continent in 1947 (Roy, 2000).

Following the partition in 1947, CHT was ceded to Pakistan, despite it was a non-Muslim area. From the very beginning the Pakistani regime considered the CHT people as the “hostile elements and pro-Indians” (Uttaran, 1985:36). Consequently, the Pakistan regime adopted various anti-indigenous policies. First, it amended the legal instruments pertaining to CHT. In 1962, the administrative status of CHT was changed from ‘Excluded Area’ to ‘Tribal Inhabited Area’. Then in 1964, the Pakistan government totally scrapped off the ‘‘Tribal Inhabited Area’ from the Pakistan constitution to open CHT for the Bengali settlers (Adnan, 2004). Second, the Pakistan government appropriated natural resources through construction of a large hydroelectric dam at Kaptai in 1961 (ibid). By that dam, 54% of the total amount of arable lands in CHT went under water and more than hundred thousands of indigenous peoples were displaced from their ancestral lands (Chakma, 2005). Under these circumstances, a group of educated indigenous activists already started mobilising indigenous people, especially students and youth against the Pakistani discriminatory policies.

Immediately after independence in 1971, the Bengali ruling elites declared Bangladesh a ‘mono-national and mono-cultural’ state based on Bengali nationalism (Chakma, 2010a:287). By the first constitution of 1972, all citizens of Bangladesh were made ‘Bangalis’, regardless of ethnic identities, religion and culture of indigenous peoples (article 6(2) of the constitution). Moreover, article 3 of the constitution has declared ‘Bengali’ as the state language subsuming the indigenous people’s languages and culture; while article 1 has declared Bangladesh a ‘unitary’ republic that implies that no separate legislature or autonomy is possible for CHT (Islam, 2003). Thus constitutionally no rights and distinct identities of indigenous peoples have been recognised in the new constitution of Bangladesh in the name of ‘national integration’ (Islam, 1981; Zaman, 1982; Ahsan and Chakma, 1989).

Being worried about the future of indigenous peoples, MN Larma, MP, in the house of parliament demanded autonomy for CHT with constitutional guarantee of the indigenous rights and identities. But his demand was categorically rejected by the house.

Consequently PCJSS was formed in 1972 under the leadership of M.N Larma with an objective to achieve autonomy for CHT. When all democratic avenues failed to draw the attention of the State, PCJSS launched an armed struggle against the GoB since 1976 onwards (Jimi, 1985 and Uttaran, 1985).

On the other hand, to suppress the autonomy movement, the GoB adopted two radical measures: militarisation; and minorisation of indigenous people through transferring the Bengali settlers from the plains into CHT. The government increased the number of military forces across the whole CHT. Although no exact figure was available, it was estimated that two-third of the Bangladesh army was deployed in CHT (Uddin, 2008:17). While the CHT Commission (1991:35) reported, one military force for every ten indigenous persons had been deployed during the period from 1982 to 1990.

The other objective of the government was to minoritise indigenous peoples through changing the demographic composition. To this effect, the government brought 400,000 Bengali settlers into CHT during 1978 to 1984 (CHTC, 1991). The government promised those Bengali settlers to provide with land grants, cash and rations, but the suitable amount of land was already scarce in the hilly CHT. Hence, fully backed by the Bangladesh army and civil administration, the Bengali settlers started grabbing lands from indigenous villagers. Simultaneously, the Bengali settlers and the military forces jointly carried out systematic massacres and communal attacks on indigenous people across the whole CHT. PCJSS (2005) and Chakma (2010b) report more one dozen of massacres that took place from 1971 to 1993 in CHT. No exact figure was available, however, it was estimated that 30,000 people lost lives, and 80000 indigenous people crossed the Indian border to take refuge in Tripura state of India (Feeny, 2001).

Alongside the armed fighting between the military forces and PCJSS’ guerrillas, the systematic massacres, killings and rapes of indigenous villagers and women by the Bengali settlers continued unabated until the PA in 1997. Signing the PA puts an end to the armed conflict, but still now the violent conflicts erupt off and on between the indigenous villagers and the Bengali settlers in the post-PA period.

3.0 THE PEACE PROCESS

The peace processes in CHT, Bangladesh could be analysed in two aspects. First, the dialogues initiated by the military-backed autocratic regimes from 1976 to 1990, and second, the initiatives of peace process under the democratically elected governments from 1991 to 1997.

From 1976 to 1990, Bangladesh was ruled by the military backed governments – Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jatiya Party (JP). The BNP government led by President Ziaur Rahman (1976 to 1981) was reluctant to negotiate with the indigenous guerrillas; rather it wanted to a military solution. Following a military coup in 1981 president Ziaur Rahman got killed and then Lt. General Hussain Md. Ershard took over the power of the country. The Ershad government (1981 to 1990) first felt the need to solve the CHT problem through a political means. To this effect, a 3-member CHT Liaison Committee headed by Upendra Lal Chakma, MP, was formed in 1984 (Larma, 2003). The Ershad government held 6 rounds of talks with the PCJSS, but no tangible outcome achieved.

Following a mass upsurge across the country in 1990, the Ershad government toppled down. Then through a national election in 1991, the BNP led by Khaleda Zia was elected to form a government. The transition from military rules to democracy brought in a new hope to the PCJSS, which, as a good gesture to the BNP government, declared a unilateral ceasefire on 10 August 1992 (Larma, 2003). In response to it, the BNP government formed a Parliamentary Committee on CHT issue with Col. (Rtd.) Oli Ahmed, Communication Minister in the chair. The Parliamentary Committee held 13 rounds of talks with the PCJSS from 1992 to 1995, but no substantial progress could be achieved due to lack of strong political commitment of the BNP government (CHTC, 1997; Larma, 2003).

In 1996, following a national election the Awami League (AL), which led the Bangladesh liberation war, came to the power after 21 years since 1975. To attract the newly formed AL government’s attention, the PCJSS extended the ceasefire unilaterally. The AL government also responded to it positively by forming an 11-member National Committee on Chittagong Hill Tracts (NCCHT) on 1 October 1996 with Chief Whip, Abul Hasnat Abdullah (CHTC, 1997). To assist the NCCHT, the government also formed a 10-member Advisory Committee to co-opt the former army officials and civil society members. Following the six rounds of talks, both parties the NCCHT and the PCJSS agreed to a peace agreement, which was signed on 2 December 1997 in Dhaka.

Here, it is notable that no third party was involved in the peace negotiation process. However, some authors such as Mohsin (2003) and Islam (2003) stated that a few international factors had been instrumental to bring the PCJSS to the negotiation. First, the AL historically had good relations with India; second, it was often alleged by the GoB that the PCJSS guerrillas used the Indian territory as their hinterland, for which India now was no longer interested to support the PCJSS; and third, international pressure, especially from human rights bodies and donor agencies on the GoB to settle the CHT problem peacefully. Fourth, the PCJSS’ readiness to seek political solution following revival of democracy during 1990s in Bangladesh (Husain, 1997). Although no international mediator was involved in the peace process, the PA gained international acclamation, for which Sheikh Hasina, Prime Minister of Bangladesh, received the UNESCO Peace Prize in 1999 (Jamil, and Panday, 2008).

4.0 PEACEBUILDING PRIORITIES IN THE PEACE ACCORD

In order to get a pragmatic solution, Paris (2005:768) suggests that peacebuilding should focus on the “prevention of large-scale violence” in the post-conflict settings. But there are different views on the peacebuilding priorities. According to David (1999: 27) the three elements are central to peacebuilding: security transition; democratic transition and socio-economic transition. By drawing on David, this section examines the peacebuilding priorities of the PA in the post-conflict settings in CHT.

4.1 SECURITY TRANSITION

One of the objectives of security transition is to prevent resumption of violence. To achieve this objective a few measures have been included in the PA.

4.1.1 Disarmament and reintegration of the combatants

It is notable here that the conflict in CHT was between the PCJSS’ guerrillas and the regular government military forces. Hence, one of the provisions included in the PA was to disarm the combatants. As per the provisions (sections 12 & 13 of Part D of the PA) the PCJSS was required to submit the list of arms and ammunition including the number of combatants to the government within the 45 days since after signing the PA. Then the government and the PCJSS jointly decided the phases of depositing arms and bringing the combatants’ family members to normal life. All combatants were granted amnesty.

In order reintegrate the ex-combatants and their families to society, the PA included a package of facilities that include: i) a lump sum cash payment for re-establishment; ii) remission of loan, if any; iii) reinstatement of combatants to their previous positions, if any; iv) recruitment to various government services according to their qualifications; v) bank loans for self-employment; and vi) educational facilities for children.

As per the provisions of the PA, PCJSS deposited arms and ammunition to the government. Of some 1900 ex-combatants, 682 were recruited in the police force, and 64 were reinstated to their previous services. But no measure has been taken to generate self-employment opportunities for the ex-combatants or their family members (PCJSS, 2003).

4.1.2 Repatriation of the refugees

The PA included a provision for repatriation of indigenous refugees who crossed the Indian border. The government offered a package of facilities for the returnee refugees. Of these, the major ones included were a lump sum cash payment; food ration; materials for construction of houses; returning lands to the families, who lost their lands to outsiders; remission of agricultural loans, and cash payment for purchase of plough cattle and so on. According to the PCJSS report (2003) some 70,000 refugees took shelter in India. Of them, 64000 people repatriated home following the PA.

4.1.3 Rehabilitation of internally displaced persons

During the conflict period, thousands of people internally were displaced within CHT. To rehabilitate those internally displaced persons (IDPs), the PA (section 1 of Part D) provides for a Task Force. Immediately after the PA, the Task Force was formed with an indigenous MP from the ruling party, in the chair. The first task of the Task Force was to determine the criteria of and identify the IDPs. Unfortunately that Task Force could not advance its activities as then chair of the Task Force unilaterally included the Bengali settlers in the list of IDPs (PCJSS, 2003). Claiming this decision as “anti-peace Accord”, the PCJSS opposed the inclusion of the Bengali settlers in the IDPs’ list. Until now, the Task Force could not make any progress for rehabilitation of IDPs.

4.1.4 Demilitarisation and mixed police force

Militarisation has been a serious threat to human rights protection in CHT. Across the whole CHT, there are more than 500 military camps. Therefore, to assist demilitarisation and improve law and order situation in CHT, the PA stipulates: i) all temporary camps of security forces would be withdrawn except six major cantonments in CHT (section 17 (a) of Part D of the PA); and ii) local police force with local indigenous persons.

So far, no actual figure is available about the status of withdrawal of military camps. Instead the government imposed a new military rules, called Operation Uttoran (upliftment), by which the military forces are allowed to control civil administration, law and order including implementation of certain development programs such as “Shantakaran” (pacification) and “Ashrayan” (shelter) projects for the Bengali settlers in the post-accord period (PCJSS, 2005).

4.2 DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

4.2.1 Political participation

To ensure political representation of indigenous peoples in state affairs, three special governance structures have been set up. These are: i) a ministry exclusively for CHT; ii) a regional council over three hill districts of CHT; and iii) hill district council (HDC) in each district of CHT.

The Ministry of CHT Affairs (MoCHTA) is headed by an indigenous person. Its main role is to supervise and coordinate overall development matters and administrative activities of CHT region. At the national level, the MoCHTA is mandated to uphold the interest of the CHT people by coordinating with other line ministries, and providing advisory support to the central government with regards to CHT affairs.

Over three hill district, the CHT Regional Council (CHTRC) also has been established with 22 members under the leadership of Jyotirindra Bodhipriya (Santu) Larma, head of the former guerrilla force. Two-third seats have been reserved for indigenous persons including the position of chair. The CHTRC has a mandate to coordinate and supervise all activities of three HDCs, general civil administration and law and order, and all other development activities/programs undertaken by the local authorities in CHT. It also may advise the central government before making any laws concerning CHT at the national level (Article 53 of CHTRC Act 1998).

For each district of CHT, a Hill District Council (HDC) has been established under the leadership of indigenous person. Proportional representation from all communities has been ensured in the HDCs. As per the PA, 33 subjects of public services of the central government would be delegated to the HDCs to ensure economic, social and cultural development. Of which, the major ones are education, (primary and secondary); health; agriculture and forestry; livestock; fisheries; cooperatives; commerce and industries; social welfare; culture; land and land management; indigenous custom, tradition and social justice system and so forth.

4.2.2 Election of the Hill Councils

As per the PA, the HDCs will be constituted with elected representatives. Then the CHTRC will be formed through the votes of the HDCs members. Due to lack of subsidiary legislation on the election procedures, the elections of the HDCs could not be held yet. So, the interim Councils are running functions now.

4.3 SOCIO-ECONOMIC TRANSITION

This aspect relates to the reconstruction of economic and social services in the post conflict settings. It depends on the following issues, which the PA has tried to address.

4.3.1 Delegation of authority to the Hill Councils

As discussed in section 4.2.1, the CHTRC and the HDCs are expected to be powerful institutions to carry out development programs and to provide basic services to the people in CHT. But due to lack of subsidiary legislation and lack of political support, the CHTRC is yet to be able to fully exercise its power to coordinate and supervise overall development activities, general administration and law and order in CHT (Larma, 2003).

Similarly, the HDCs have not been empowered to function properly for the economic, social and cultural development of the people in CHT. In 13 years of the signing the PA, the central government delegated only 12 out of 33 transferable subjects to the HDCs (PCJSS, 2010).

As such, the effectiveness of these Hill Councils to contribute to the reconstruction of the conflict affected society substantially has remained unutilised, as the central government did not delegate authorities to them.

4.3.2 Resolution of Land Disputes

Due to government-sponsored population transmigration program, the conflict over the land ownership between the Bengali settlers and indigenous people is now at the centre of conflict in CHT. To resolve all disputes related to lands in CHT, the PA stipulates a Commission on land.

Simultaneously, the HDCs have the authority to control all types of lands, except the lands of the public institutions in CHT. Without prior approval of the HDCs, no lands could be transferred to others (article 64 of HDC Act 1998).

In reality, in 13 years of the PA, the Land Commission could not function due to inconsistencies between commission’s law and the PA. To remove those inconsistencies, the Hill Councils, especially the CHTRC put recommendations to the government, but so far no government has taken any effective measures to this effect (PCJSS, 2005).

5.0 WHAT ARE MISSING TO BUILD PEACE IN THE PEACE ACCORD

The PA could be critiqued from different perspectives. However, the following issues, that are central to the roots of structural violence in CHT, have not been addressed in the PA.

i) Withdrawal of Bengali settlers: Under the government sponsorship approximately 400000 Bengali settlers had been brought into CHT (see section 2.0). To grab lands, these Bengali settlers backed by the army carried out system massacres and killings on indigenous people. But the PA directly did not address the withdrawal of the Bengali settlers. Even in the post-Accord period, infiltration of the Bengali settlers into CHT continues unabated.

ii) Justice and reconciliation: During the conflict between the Bengali settlers and indigenous villagers, and between the government forces and guerrillas, many people lost lives and beloved ones. Many indigenous women have been victimised of rapes by the Bengali settlers and military forces. The PA has remained silent about the massacres, and justice and reconciliation of the affected people.

iii) Non-recognition of identities: One of the roots of the conflict was non-recognition of distinct identities of indigenous peoples in the constitution. The PA did not address the identity question. Instead, it used the term ‘tribal’, which is derogatory. By denying indigenous identities, the government tend to renege upon the indigenous rights to autonomy. Moreover, the PA has not been safeguarded constitutionally, for which any government may repeal it with a simple majority in the parliament.

iv) No roadmap for implementation: There is no clear roadmap for implementation of the provisions of the PA. This loophole leaves a room for the government to dillydally implementation of its obligations.

6.0 CONCLUSION
The conflict emerged from non-recognition of ethnic identities of indigenous peoples during the statebuilding process of nation state. In that sense, the conflict in CHT, Bangladesh is between the nation state and indigenous peoples, where the latter want recognition of their rights and identities in the state system; while the former denies accepting it.

As indigenous peoples were persisting with the demand for autonomy, the state took resort to the two radical measures – militarisation and minoritisation of indigenous people. As part of the minoritisation policy, the state sponsored importing Bengali settlers from the plains into the indigenous inhabited CHT region. Consequently there had been competition over lands and resources in CHT, where the state (the army) took side with the Bengali settlers against the indigenous people. Thus the state camouflaged its role in the conflict by unleashing the Bengali settlers from behind against the non-Bengalis (indigenous people).

The CHT peace process has had several distinct features such as: i) no external mediation was involved; ii) military intervention i.e. military-backed governments could not achieve success; iii) effective dialogue was possible following a transition from autocratic rules to democracy in the country; and iv) political commitment of both parties (the GoB and the PCJSS) to solve the conflict. To increase confidence of the guerrillas, the GoB established a parliamentary body, which negotiated with the PCJSS for a peaceful and political solution and that resulted in a peace accord.

The PA has set out a wide range of priorities, which could be divided into several categories such as i) political representation; ii) disarmament and rehabilitation; iii) resolution of land disputes; and iv) demilitarisation. Disarmament and reintegration of the ex-combatants and repartition of refugees have taken place substantially. But of the ‘other priorities’, some have remained partially addressed and some completely unaddressed since signing the PA. Of these priorities, resolution of land disputes and rehabilitation of IDPs, and election of the hill councils have remained untouched upon.

On top of all these issues, the PA is silent about the roots of violent conflicts such as withdrawal of the Bengali settlers, and constitutional recognition of indigenous identities, including the issues of justice and reconciliation. To protect the Bengali settlers, the army still has maintained not only its high physical presence, but also interference in civil matters in CHT. As long as the withdrawal of the settlers and military rules will go unattended, the violent conflicts tend to continue in CHT intermittently (Chakma, 2010b).

Finally, it can be said that the PA itself cannot bring lasting peace unless the parties to the PA do have mutual respect, trust and commitment to each other. The same thing happened in the case of the CHT peace process. Non-implementation of the peacebuilding priorities in CHT does not relate to the limitation of the PA itself; rather it ensues from the absence of the political commitment of the government.




References

ACHR (Asian Centre for Human Rights) (2010) Bangladesh: IPs Massacred for Land Grab, 23 February, viewed on 10 October 2010, available at http://www.achrweb.org/reports/bangla/CHT012010.pdf.

Adnan, Shapan (2004) Migration, Land Alienation and Ethnic Conflict: Causes of Poverty in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh, Dhaka: Research and Advisory Services.

Ahsan, Aziz-al and Chakma, Bhumitra (1989) ‘Problems of National Integration in Bangladesh: The Chittagong Hill Tracts’, Asian Survey, 29(10): 959 – 970.

Chakma, Bhumitra (2010a) ‘Post-colonial state and minorities: ethnocide in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh’, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 48(3): 281 – 300.

Chakma, Bhumitra (2010b) ‘Post-colonial state and minorities: ethnocide in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh’, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 48(3): 281 – 300.

Chakma, Bhumitra (2010b) ‘Structural Roots of Violence in the Chittagong Hill Tracts’, Economic and Political Weekly, XLV (12): 19 – 21.

Chakma, Mangal Kumar (2005) ‘Challenges and Opportunities for Engaging Indigenous Peoples in the Chittagong Hill Tracts’, a paper presented at the workshop on Engaging the Marginalized – Partnerships between Indigenous Peoples, Governments and Civil Society held on 14 - 17 August 2005 at Brisbane Convention & Exhibition Centre, Queensland, Australia.

Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission (1991) Life Is Not Ours – Land and Human Rights in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh, Copenhagen: International Work Group on Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA).

Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission (1997) Life Is Not Ours – Land and Human Rights in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh, Update 3, Copenhagen: International Work Group on Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA).

David, Charles-Philippe (1999) ‘Does Peacebuilding Build Peace? Liberal (Mis)steps in the Peace Process’, Security Dialogue 30 (1): 25 – 41.

Feeny, Thomas (2001) ‘Fragility of Peace in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh’, Forced Migration Review, FMR 11, viewed on 25 October 2010, available at http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR11/fmr11.10.pdf.

Husain, Syed Anwar (1997) ‘State and Ethnicity: the Case of Bangladesh’, South Asian Survey 4(2): 221 – 234.

Islam, Syed Nazmul (1981) ‘The Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh: Integrational Crisis Between Centre and Periphery’, Asian Survey 21 (12): 1211-1222.

Islam, Syed Serajul (2003) ‘The Insurgency Movement in Chittagong Hill Tracts: Internal and External Dimensions’, The Journal of Third World Studies 20(2): 137 – 159.

Jamil, I and Panday, P. K. (2008) ‘The Elusive Peace Accord in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh and the Plight of Indigenous People’ Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 46(4): 464 – 489.

Jeong, Ho-Won (2005) Peacebuilding in Post-conflict Societies: Strategies and Process, Lynne Reinner Publisher: London.

Jimi (1985) ‘A Vision for the Movement of Self-determination’, In Remembrance of the 10th November 1983 (in Bengali), PCJSS, pp. 13 – 19.

Larma, J.B (2003) ‘The CHT Issue and its Solution’, a paper presented at the Regional Training Program to Enhance the Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building Capacities of Indigenous Peoples’ Representatives of the Asia-Pacific” held in Chiang Mai, Thailand from 7-12 April 2003 organized by United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR).

Mohsin, Amena (2003) The Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh on the Long Road to Peace, International Peace Academy Paper Series, London: Lynne Rienner Publisher Inc.

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Paris, Roland (2005) ‘Towards more Effective Peacebuilding: A Conversation with Roland Paris’, Development in Practice 15(6): 767 – 776.

Roy, Raja Devasish (2004) ‘The Land Question and the Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord’ in Mizanur Rahman (ed.) Land: A Journal of Practitioners, Development and Research Activists 11(7): 43-65, Dhaka: Association for Land Reform and Development (ALRD).

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Tuesday, September 7, 2010

CONCERN OVER CONDUCT OF LAND SURVEY IN CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS, BANGLADESH

by Raja Devasish Roy, Chief, Chakma Circle

[Raja Roy writes about the concern over the proposed land survey in CHT. With a view to circulating it and raising awareness among the people, this piece has been posted on here]  

The indigenous Jumma people in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) region in Bangladesh, and the indigenous Jummas living in other parts of the world are gravely concerned at imminent programmes of the CHT Land Disputes Resolution Commission and the Government of Bangladesh to conduct a Land Survey in the CHT.


The proposed survey, if conducted, will be so done without the prior, informed consent of the indigenous peoples of the region and in violation of the express provisions of the CHT Accord of 1997 otherwise known as the “peace accord”.

Photo: Midori Matsuda
The CHT Accord of 1997 provides that a land survey should only be conducted if the following eventualities take place: (i) the resolution of land disputes; (ii) the rehabilitation of the India-returned international Jumma refuges and the internally displaced (indigenous) people; (iii) land grants to landless indigenous people; and (iv) the request of the CHT Regional Council. Although most of the refugees have been rehabilitated, some refugees and all of the Jumma displaced people remain un-rehabilitated. The other eventualities, mentioned above (i, iii and iv), have also not happened. Therefore, a survey would be premature and not in accordance with the Accord.

Based upon the experience of similar surveys conducted in the past, indigenous communities are fearful that such a survey will lead to further land alienation through the appropriation of their lands by unlawful settlers, private companies, government departments and elite city-dwellers.

A survey as proposed, is more than likely to lead to the legitimization of unlawful occupation by outsiders of the indigenous peoples’ customarily used lands. Similarly, the survey is almost certain to lead to the privatization of indigenous commons through the de-recognition of oral tradition-oriented customary regimes and practices on the ownership, occupation and use of homesteads, agricultural land, community forests, grazing lands, grasslands and water bodies. Land surveys are based upon concepts of land ownership, use, occupation, record of rights and so forth in accordance with land ownership and land survey laws of the plains districts of Bangladesh, which have no manner of application to the CHT. The CHT is administered in accordance with the CHT Regulation, 1900, read with the Hill District Councils Acts of 1989 and the CHT Regional Council Act of 1998, which recognize the customary land rights of the indigenous peoples.

It is believed that the proposed survey is to be started at the behest of Mr. Justice Khademul Islam, the chairperson of the CHT Land Disputes Resolution Commission, and other government officials. This is being done in gross violation of the provisions of the CHT Land Disputes Resolution Commission Act of 2001 and other relevant laws, and against the wishes of the majority of the members of the commission, including the chairperson of the CHT Regional Council, the chairpersons of the three Hill District Councils and the three traditional rajas or Circle Chiefs. Many of the aforesaid indigenous leaders have formally protested against the proposed survey and called upon the government, including in writing, to suspend the work of the commission until such time as the inconsistencies between the Land Commission law and the provisions of the CHT Accord of 1997 are resolved through legal amendments in consultation with the CHT Regional Council and there is consensus on the procedure of dispute resolution among the members.

One of the results of a survey is information and data on the surveyed land: about its physical properties (whether the land is lowland or slope, water body or land, whether there is vegetation on it or not), its measurements, and the identity of its present occupiers and so forth. If, theoretically, the Land Commission were to recover possession of unlawfully occupied land and declare illegal unlawful settlements (which is within its mandate), what then would be the use of obtaining a picture of the current status of land statistics and the identity of the occupants, which might change after dispute resolution by the commission? Why would one spend so much time, effort and money to do such a survey? Thus there is every reason to suspect that there is no intention of changing the status quo.

There is also every reason to suspect that there is an intention to re-settle non-indigenous migrants people on land on which there is no registered title (which may emerge after a land survey), which may be termed “khas”. The concept of khas does not apply to the CHT. Khas lands are those lands in the plains that were not recorded in the name of any person or institution when the title of those lands were transferred from the zamindars (landlords) to the state in 1950, with the abolition of zamindary. There was no zamindary in the CHT, and the concerned land law that recognizes the concept of khas (East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act of 1950) does not apply to the CHT. CHT lands that are not settled or leased out in the name of any person or institution are the customary commons of the hill peoples, whether they are forest, swidden (jum) land, grazing land, grassland or water body.

The conduct of a survey will in practice amount to the divestment of responsibility of the functions of the CHT Land Disputes Resolution Commission – to provide a just resolution to the problem of land alienation and land dispossession in accordance with the “laws, customs and usages” of the CHT - to dispute resolution by survey officials who have no knowledge and experience of custom-based land ownership and use. One cannot of course expect that the CHT people – particularly the Jummas – are going to get more justice at the hands of survey officials (Kanungo, Amin, Surveyors, Chainmen) than at the hands of a commission in which their representatives have a role in decision-making.

A land survey, if deemed appropriate, should only be done in the CHT after the concerned land and survey laws are amended to adequately acknowledge the customary land rights of the indigenous peoples of the CHT and in accordance with the provisions of the CHT Accord of 1997, as mentioned above.

This applies to survey anywhere in the CHT, whether for ‘disputed’ lands or ‘undisputed’ lands.

Saturday, August 28, 2010

পার্বত্য ভূমিবিরোধ নিষ্পত্তি ও ভূমিকমিশন চেয়ারম্যানের ব্যবস্থাপত্র

সংবিধান সংশোধন ও আদিবাসীদের সাংবিধানিক স্বীকৃতির দাবীটি এখন সবচেয়ে আলোচিত হয়ে দাঁড়িয়ছে।ঠিক সেই মুহুর্তে দৈনিক ‘প্রথম আলো’গত ২৫ আগস্ট “পার্বত্য ভূমিবিরোধ নিষ্পত্তি আইনে ছয়টি ধারা সংশোধন ও বিরোধহীনভূমি জরিপ হবে” মর্মে একটি সংবাদ ছাপিয়েছে।আজকে ২৮ আগস্ট যখন এ লেখাটি তৈরী করছিলাম, তখন ‘প্রথম আলো’তে ভূমিবিরোধ নিষ্পত্তি বিষয়ে একটি সম্পাদকীয় চোখে পড়ল।এতে বিরোধহীনভূমিতে জরিপ করলে সমস্যা থাকার কথা নয় উল্লেখ করে বিষয়টিতে আদিবাসী নেতাদের সমর্থন জানানো উচিত এবং সব আশংকা দূরীকরণের জন্যে প্রশাসনের তরফে প্রয়োজনীয় পদক্ষেপ নেওয়া প্রয়োজন বলে মন্তব্য করা হয়েছে।জানিনা, উল্লেখিত সংবাদ ও ‘প্রথম আলো’র সম্পাদকীয়টি আমাদের পার্বত্য নেতারা কিভাবে আমলে নিচ্ছেন।তবে গত ২৫ আগস্টে প্রকাশিত সংবাদে কয়েকটি উল্লেখযোগ্য দিক রয়েছে।সেগুলো আলোচনার দাবী রাখে। যেমন,

(১)সংবাদে বলা হয়েছে, পুরোনো আইনে বন্দোবস্ত, বিরোধনিষ্পত্তি, পুনর্বাসিত শরণার্থী, দখল-বেদখল ও আবেদনের পদ্ধতি নিয়ে যে অসংগতি রয়েছে তা দূর করার জন্যে ভূমিবিরোধ নিষ্পত্তি কমিশনের ছয়টি ধারা সংশোধনের জন্যে সরকার উদ্যোগ নিয়েছে।

(২)ভূমি সচিবের উদ্ধৃতি দিয়ে বলা হয়েছে, পার্বত্য এলাকার যেসব ভূমি নিয়ে কোন সমস্যা নেই, সেই অংশে সরকার জরিপের উদ্যোগ নিচ্ছে।তবে এ ব্যাপারে পার্বত্য নেতাদের মতামত নেওয়া হবে বলে জানান।

(৩) পার্বত্য চুক্তিতে ভূমিবিরোধ নিষ্পতির পরে ভূমিজরিপের কথা স্পষ্টভাবে বলা হলেও ভূমিকমিশন চেয়ারম্যান বিচারপতি (অবঃ) খাদেমূল ইসলাম চৌধুরী আবারও জোর দিয়ে বললেন, “আগে জরিপ করতে হবে,তারপর ভূমিবিরোধ নিষ্পত্তি। জরিপ কার্যক্রম শুরু না হলে পার্বত্য চট্টগ্রামে শান্তি,স্থিতিশীলতা, সামাজিক, অর্থনৈতিক উন্নয়নে সরকারের সব উদ্যোগ ব্যর্থ হয়ে যাবে”।

Justice (retd) Khademul Islam Chowdhury, Chairman, CHT Land Commission, and Mr. Jatindra Lal Tripura, MP and Chairman, Task Force on Rehabilitation of Refugees and IDPs.
এ লেখায় ১ নং বিষয়ে বিস্তারিতভাবে বলার প্রয়োজন নেই।কেননা,ভূমি বিরোধ নিষ্পত্তি কমিশনের আইনে বিসমিল্লায় গলদ ছিল,সে কারণে এ কমিশন দীর্ঘ একযুগ সময়েও কোন কাজ করতে পারেনি।অন্যদিকে বারবার সরকার পরিবর্তন হলেও এ যাবত কোন সরকারই আইন সংশোধনে কোন কার্যকর উদ্যোগ নেয়নি।যদি আওয়ামী নেতৃত্বাধীন বর্তমান মহাজোট সরকার পার্বত্যচুক্তির মূল চেতনার সাথে সংগতি রেখে ‘ভূমি বিরোধ নিষ্পত্তি কমিশনের আইন’ সংশোধন করে এবং সেভাবে কার্যকর পদক্ষেপ গ্রহণ করে তাহলে সাধুবাদ জানাতে হবে।তবে শেষটা না দেখা পর্যন্ত এখনও আশান্বিত হওয়ার কোন কারণ নেই।

এদিকে ভূমিবিরোধ নিষ্পত্তি কমিশন আইনে সংশোধন হোক আর নাই হোক উপরে উল্লেখিত ২ নং ও ৩ নং বিষয়ে কিছু আশংকা রয়েছে সেগুলো একটু আলোচনা করা প্রয়োজন।উক্ত দু’টো বিষয়ই ভূমি জরিপ সংক্রান্ত।গত বছর দায়িত্ব নেওয়ার পর থেকেই ভূমিকমিশন চেয়ারম্যান খাদেমুল সাহেব একটি প্রশ্নের জন্ম দিয়েছেন, ‘কোনটা আগে - ভূমি জরিপ নাকি বিরোধ নিষ্পত্তি? এ প্রশ্নের সাথে সরকার আরো একটি প্রশ্নের জন্ম দিতে যাচ্ছে,‘ভূমি জরিপ কোথায় থেকে শুরু হবে?বিরোধহীন ভূমি থেকে নাকি বিরোধপূর্ণ ভূমি থেকে?

আইনি কিতাবে যাই লেখা থাকুক, খাদেমুল সাহেব তো আগেই একটা ব্যবস্থাপত্র দিয়ে রেখেছেন, আগে ভূমি জরিপ করতে হবে।তারপর ভূমিবিরোধ নিষ্পত্তি হবে। এবার এ কথার সাথে আরো একটি ভয়ংকর কথা যোগ করলেন, “জরিপ কার্যক্রম শুরু না হলে পার্বত্য চট্টগ্রামে শান্তি, স্থিতিশীলতা, সামাজিক, অর্থনৈতিক উন্নয়নে সরকারের সব উদ্যোগ ব্যর্থ হয়ে যাবে”। ভূমি জরিপ তো পার্বত্য চট্টগ্রামে অনেক যুগ ধরে হয় নি; তাহলে কী ধরে নেবো খাদেমুল ভূমি কমিশনের চেয়ারম্যান হওয়ার আগ পর্যন্ত পার্বত্য চট্টগ্রামে গৃহীত সব সরকারী উদ্যোগ ব্যর্থ হয়েছিল? ‘ভূমি জরিপ’ না হলে ‘সরকারের সব উদ্যোগ ব্যর্থ হবে’-খাদেমুলের এ বক্তব্য পড়ে ভাবছিলাম তিনি কিভাবে পার্বত্য ভূমিবিরোধ নিষ্পত্তি ‘ব্যবস্থাপত্রে’ নতুন নতুন ‘অনুপান’ জুরে দিচ্ছেন।মনে পড়ল,মারমা ভাষার প্রবাদ বাক্যটা “ল্যূমা ল্যূ হিরে চিগা মা চিগা হিরে”(মানুষের মধ্যে মানুষ আছে কথার মধ্যে কথা আছে)(মারমা ভাইবোনেরা ভুল হলে শুদ্ধ করে দেবেন)।প্রশ্ন জাগে মনে, সরকার ও খাদেমুলের আপাত: নিদোর্ষ ‘কথা’গুলোর মধ্যে কী ‘কথা’ আছে, আর ভূমি কমিশন চেয়ারম্যান ‘খাদেমুলে’র মধ্যে কোন ‘খাদেমুল’ আছে? বিশ্লেষণ করে দেখা যাক ভূমি জরিপের “ল্যূমা ল্যূ হিরে চিগা মা চিগা হিরে” কথাটা।

মনে হচ্ছে, সরকার একটু চালাকি করে এগোতে চায়। ভূমি জরিপ ‘আগে’ হবে বা ‘পরে’ হবে সেরকম কিছু না বলে সরকার এখন বলছে পার্বত্য নেতাদের মতামত নিয়ে ‘বিরোধহীনভূমি’ জরিপ হবে।পার্বত্য নেতারা কী মতামত দেবেন জানিনা। কিন্তু আমার মনে অনেক প্রশ্ন জাগে,বিরোধহীনভূমিতে কেন আগে জরিপ শুরু করা প্রয়োজন? বিরোধহীনভূমিতে জরিপ করার উদ্দেশ্য কী? কোনগুলোই বা বিরোধহীনভূমি? সরকারের “বিরোধহীনভূমিতে জরিপ” কিংবা খাদেমুলের “আগে ভূমি জরিপ করতে হবে” এরকম কথার মধ্যে আরো কিছু কথা আছে বলে মনে হয়। সেগুলো হলোঃ

১. খাদেমুলের মত “ভূমি জরিপ আগে হতে হবে” এরকম কিছু না বললেও সরকার পরোক্ষভাবে খাদেমুলের ব্যবস্থাপত্র অনুসরণ করতে চাচ্ছে।সরকার হয়তো মনে করছে যে কোন ভাবে জরিপ শুরু করা গেলে সেটা যে কোন প্রকারে শেষ করা যাবে।প্রয়োজনে সেনা-পুলিশ-বর্ডার গার্ড নিয়োগ করে হলেও সেটা শেষ করা যাবে।

২. ভূমিবিরোধ নিষ্পত্তির লক্ষ্যে জরিপের কথা বলা হলেও সরকারের বা খাদেমুলের উদ্দেশ্য অত্যন্ত আন্তরিক ও সৎ উদ্দেশ্যপ্রণোদিত একথা বিশ্বাস করার কোন কারণ নেই। সেরকম বাস্তব প্রমাণ তাদের কাছ থেকে এখনো পাওয়া যায়নি।‘বিরোধহীনভূমি’ বলতে কী বুঝায় সেটা পরিস্কার না করে ভূমি জরিপ শুরু করার চেষ্টাটা একটি কুটচাল ছাড়া আর কিছুই হতে পারে না।

৩. ‘বিরোধহীন ভূমি’তে জরিপ করার অনুমোদন দেওয়ার অর্থ হলো বিরোধ নিষ্পত্তির আগে জরিপ করতে দেওয়া।অন্যদিকে বিরোধ নিষ্পত্তির আগে ভূমি জরিপ করার পেছনে সরকার বা খাদেমুলের কয়েকটি উদ্দেশ্য থাকতে পারে। যেমন, ক) জরিপের মাধ্যমে কোথায় কোথায় কী কী ধরনের, কী পরিমাণের জমি আছে, সরকারী ভাষায় কোথায় কোথায় খাসজমি আছে, কোথায় কোথায় পাহাড়, বন ও নদীনালা আছে, কোথায় কোথায় কী পরিমাণ বন্দোস্তকৃত ও অবন্দোস্তকৃত জমি আছে সেগুলো চিহ্নিত করা যাবে;খ) জরিপের মাধ্যমে সব ভূমি চিহ্নিত করার উদ্দেশ্যের পেছনে একটি অন্তর্নিহিত বার্তা আছে। সেটা হলো ভূমিবিরোধ নিষ্পত্তির বিচারকালে যদি কোন সেটেলার অবৈধ দখলদার হিসেবে প্রমাণিত হয়, তাহলে তাকে ব্যক্তিমালিকানা বহির্ভূত সরকারী জমি অর্থাৎ খাসজমিতে বসতি দেওয়ার ব্যবস্থা করতে ভূমি কমিশন (অর্থাৎ খাদেমুল) আগেভাগে প্রস্তুত। এ যুক্তির পেছনে গত ফেব্রুয়ারীতে বাঘাইছড়িতে সংঘটিত সাম্প্রদায়িক ঘটনার কথা উল্লেখ করা যায়।যতদূর জানি,বছর তিনেক আগে সেনাক্যাম্পে কাজ করার জন্যে শ্রমিক প্রয়োজন এমন অজুহাতে সেনাবাহিনীরা কিছু সেটেলার পরিবার সেখানে নিতে চেয়েছিল। কিন্তু সেখানকার পাহাড়ীরা সেটা চায়নি, এবং প্রতিবাদ করেছিল।প্রতিবাদের মুখে সেনাবাহিনী তখন তা করতে না পারলেও বছর খানেক পরে কিছু সেটেলার পরিবার নিয়ে গিয়েছিল।তখন সেনাবাহিনী যুক্তি দিয়েছিল,“বাঙালিরা (সেটেলাররা) সরকারী (বনবিভাগের) জমিতে ঘর তুলেছে, পাহাড়ীদের জমিতে নয়”।পাহাড়ীদেরকে বাড়াবাড়ি না করার জন্যে তারা হুমকি দিয়েছিল।অবশেষে ২০১০-এর ফেব্রুয়ারীতে তা পাহাড়ী-বাঙালি দ্বন্দে রূপ নেয়।

৪. বাঘাইহাটের ঐ ঘটনার সাথে সাযুজ্য রেখে বলা যায়, ভূমি কমিশনের খাদেমুলের ভেতরে ‘সেনাবাহিনীর চেতনাসম্পন্ন খাদেমুল’ রয়েছে। প্রকাশ্যভাবে না বললেও বিচারপ্রক্রিয়ায় অবৈধ দখলদার হিসেবে প্রমাণিত সেটেলারদেরকে তথাকথিত সরকারী ‘খাস’জমিতে পুনর্বাসনের ব্যবস্থা করার চিন্তা তার মনের মধ্যে রয়েছে। ঠিক বাঘাইছড়ির সেনাবাহিনীর মত সরকার তথা খাদেমুলও পরে হয়ত বলবেন,“পাহাড়ীদের ভূমিতে নয়,সরকারী খাসজমিতে বাঙালিদের (সেটেলারদের)বসতি দেওয়া হবে”।খাদেমুল সাহেব সেটা আইনগতভাবে পাকাপোক্ত করার সুযোগ নিতে চাচ্ছেন ।এ ধরনের উদ্যোগকে অনেকে ‘পাহাড়ী-বাঙালির সহাবস্থানে’র নীতি হিসেবে বলে থাকেন।এরকম ‘সহাবস্থানের নীতি’বাস্তবায়নের অংশ হিসেবে সরকার তথা খাদেমুল ভূমি জরিপকে বিরোধ নিষ্পত্তির পূর্বশর্ত হিসেবে বিবেচনা করছেন।

৫. ভূমি জরিপের অর্থ হলো পুরো পার্বত্য চট্টগ্রামকে কাগজের টুকরো দিয়ে ব্যক্তিগত সম্পক্তিতে পরিণত করা, এবং ভাগবাটোয়ারার ব্যবস্থা করা।একবার জরিপ হয়ে গেলে পাহাড় আর পাহাড় থাকবে না, জঙ্গল আর জঙ্গল থাকবে না।আদিবাসীদের প্রথাগত ভূমি বলে আর কিছুই থাকবে না। জমি চুরি, ও ভাগবাটোয়ারার লড়াই শুরু হবে। সেই লড়াইয়ে নিরীহ জুমচাষী কিংবা সেটেলাররা জমি ভাগ পাবে কি না বড় সন্দেহ রয়েছে।সেই লড়াইয়ে বিগত তত্ত্বাবধায়ক সরকারের সাবেক উপদেষ্টা মেজর জেনারেল (অবঃ) আব্দুল মতিন ও সাংসদ অলি আহম্মদদের মত রাঘাব বোয়াল ও জেনারেলরা, সাধারণের মধ্যে অসাধারণরা ক্ষমতার জোরে ও কলমের খোঁচায় সাধারণ মানুষের প্রথাগত ভূমি কেড়ে নেবে, কখনো বা চুপিসারে চুরি করবে একথা নিশ্চিত করে বলা যায়।ক্ষমতাবানদের ভূমি দখলের অবাধ প্রতিযোগিতা শুরু হবে। তাদেরকে তখন কেউই প্রতিরোধ করতে পারবে না।

ভূমি জরিপের ঘোমটার ভেতর এসব খেমটা নাচের কথা অবশ্যই বিবেচনায় রাখা প্রয়োজন।তা না হলে ভূমি জরিপের মাধ্যমে আরো নতুন নতুন সংকট সৃষ্টি করা হবে।তাই এ মুহুর্তে ব্যাপক আকারের ভূমি জরিপ, সেটা বিরোধহীন ভূমিতে হোক আর বিরোধপূর্ণ ভূমিতে হোক- কোনভাবে কাম্য হতে পারে না।

এবার ভূমি কমিশনের চেয়ারম্যান খাদেমুলের ব্যবস্থাপত্রের নতুন ‘অনুপান’ (জরিপ কার্যক্রম শুরু না হলে পার্বত্য চট্টগ্রামে শান্তি, স্থিতিশীলতা, সামাজিক, অর্থনৈতিক উন্নয়নে সরকারের সব উদ্যোগ ব্যর্থ হয়ে যাবে)-এর দিকে একটু দৃষ্টি দেয়া যাক।খাদেমুলের এ ‘অনুপান’টা পার্বত্য চট্টগ্রাম রোগের সাথে সংগতিপূর্ণ নয়।তিনি যা বলেছেন তা কোন গবেষণালব্দ তত্ত্ব নয়,তার ভাববিলাসী মনের কল্পনা মাত্র।পার্বত্য চট্টগ্রামের শান্তি, স্থিতিশীলতা, সামাজিক ও অর্থনৈতিক উন্নয়নকে কেবল একটিমাত্র দিক ‘ভূমি জরিপে’র সাথে সংশ্লিষ্ট করেছেন,যা একদেশদর্শীতায় দুষ্ট।তাই খাদেমূলের ব্যবস্থাপত্র বেশি বিশ্লেষণের প্রয়োজন নেই।তবে পার্বত্য চট্টগ্রামে শান্তি, স্থিতিশীলতা প্রতিষ্ঠা করতে হলে, ব্যরিস্টার রাজা দেবাশীষ রায়ের ভাষায় বলতে হয়, খাদেমূলকে আমিন-কানুনগো’র কাজ করার চিন্তা বাদ দিতে হবে এবং সৃজনশীল কাজের কথা ভাবতে হবে।খাদেমুল সাহেবকে তার ব্যবস্থাপত্রে আরো কিছু ‘অনুপান’ বিবেচনায় নিতে হবে, তা না হলে তিনি ‘পার্বত্য ভূমিরোগ’ সারানোর ব্যাপারে কোন কার্যকর পদক্ষেপ নিতে পারবেন না।

১। পার্বত্য চট্টগ্রামের নেতৃবৃন্দ ভূমিজরিপের বিপক্ষে নন; তবে তারা খাদেমুলকে চুক্তির প্রতি সম্মান প্রদর্শন করার কথা বলছেন। চুক্তিতে স্পষ্ট বলা আছে,কখন ভূমি জরিপ হবে।অর্থাৎ মাঠে ময়দানে উত্তেজক বক্তব্য না রেখে ভূমি কমিশনের চেয়ারম্যান হিসেবে খাদেমুলকে ভূমি কমিশনের সব সদস্যের সাথে বসে ঐক্যমতের ভিত্তিতে সিদ্ধান্ত নিতে হবে কমিশন কী কী কাজ করবে।

২। ভূমিকমিশনের আইনে বিসমিল্লায় যে গলদ হয়েছে সেটা সংশোধনের উদ্যোগ নিতে হবে। কমিশন চেয়ারম্যানের একক কর্তৃত্বের মধ্যে ভারসাম্য নিয়ে আসতে হবে।

৩। ভূমি জরিপ নয়, কমিশনের প্রথম কাজ হওয়া উচিত কোথায় কোথায় বিরোধ আছে সেগুলো চিহ্নিত করা।এরপর ভূমি কমিশন আইন অনুসরণে সেগুলো মীমাংসার জন্যে কার্যপদ্ধতি নির্ধারণ করা।এক্ষেত্রে এক একটি কেস ধরে ভূমি কমিশন শুনানী করতে পারে।সেটা মীমাংসা করতে গিয়ে যদি কোন জরিপের প্রয়োজন হয়, তৎক্ষণাৎ বিরোধপূর্ণ ভূমিতে জরিপ করা যেতে পারে। এক্ষেত্রে জেলা/উপজেলা ভূমি অফিস সহযোগিতা দিতে পারে।এর জন্যে ঢাকঢোল বাজিয়ে সারা পার্বত্য চট্টগ্রামে ভূমি জরিপ শুরু করার প্রয়োজন পড়ে না।

৪।ন্যায়বিচার ও ক্ষতিপূরণের বিষয়টি বিবেচনায় রাখতে হবে। যেসব সেটেলার পরিবার অবৈধ দখলদার বলে বিবেচিত হবে তাদেরকে পুনর্বাসনের ব্যবস্থা করতে হবে।কিভাবে পুনর্বাসন হবে সে ব্যাপারে পুরো ভূমিকমিশন ও সরকারকে ঐক্যমত্যে পৌঁছতে হবে।খাদেমুলের একতরফা ‘সহাবস্থানের নীতিতে’ পুনর্বাসনের চেষ্টা করা হলে শান্তি প্রতিষ্ঠিত হতে পারবে না।

৫। শান্তি ও স্থিতিশীলতা বজায় রাখতে হলে পার্বত্য চট্টগ্রামে সামরিকায়ন বন্ধ করতে হবে।অপ্রিয় হলেও সত্য, সাম্প্রদায়িক ও জঙ্গীবাদী শক্তির মদদ দাতা হলো সেনাপ্রশাসনের একাংশ। তাই পার্বত্য চট্টগ্রামে শান্তি ও স্থিতিশীলতা আনতে হলে সেনাবাহিনীর নিরপেক্ষ ভূমিকা নিশ্চিত করতে হবে এবং গণতান্ত্রিক প্রশাসনের কাছে কর্তৃত্ব হস্তান্তর করে বেসামরিক প্রশাসনকে শক্তিশালী করতে হবে।

৬। আইনশৃংখলা রক্ষা ও উন্নয়নের জন্যে চুক্তি মোতাবেক মিশ্র পুলিশবাহিনী গঠন করতে হবে। জনশৃংখলা রক্ষা ও নিরাপত্তা বিধানের এ দিকটি উপেক্ষিত থাকলে উন্নয়ন কার্যক্রম পরিচালনা তথা ন্যায়বিচার প্রতিষ্ঠা করা কঠিন হবে।

আরো অনেক সুপারিশ রাখা যায়। তবে খাদেমুলকে মনে রাখতে হবে শান্তিপ্রতিষ্ঠার প্রথম ও প্রাথমিক পূর্বশর্ত হলো পারস্পরিক আস্থা, শ্রদ্ধা ও বিশ্বাসের পরিবেশ গড়ে তোলা।কিন্তু তিনি কমিশনের চেয়ারম্যান নিয়োজিত হওয়ার পর থেকেই কমিশনের অন্যান্য সদস্যদের কোন তোয়াক্কা না করে একটার পর একটা বিতর্কিত কথা বার্তা বলে বেড়াচ্ছেন।ভূমি জরিপ না হওয়ার কারণে নয়,তার নিজের একগুঁয়েমী ও একদেশদর্শী দৃষ্টিভঙ্গির কারণে পার্বত্য চট্টগ্রামে শান্তি ও স্থিতিশীলতা বিনষ্ট হতে পারে।আরো একটি বিষয় উল্লেখ করতে হয়, খাদেমুলের নির্দেশিত ব্যবস্থাপত্র পার্বত্য চট্টগ্রামের আদিবাসী সংস্কৃতির সাথে সংগতিপূর্ণ নয়।ভূমি জরিপ করা হলে আদিবাসীদের প্রথাগত ভূমি হতে বিতারণের আরো এক নতুন যুগ সূচিত হবে।দুঃখ হবে চিরস্থায়ী। বিচারপতি (অবঃ) গোলাম রাব্বানীর ভাষায়, “সমতলভূমিতে মাঠ জরিপ শেষে ইংরেজ আমলে তৈরি রেকর্ডের মতো ভূমি কমিশন কর্তৃক পার্বত্য চট্টগ্রামে তেমন রেকর্ড করা ন্যায়ত কিংবা আইনত অসিদ্ধ এবং তেমন করার উদ্যোগ নিলে আদিবাসীদের দুঃখ-যাতনা স্থায়ী হয়ে যাবে” (কালের কন্ঠ, ১৬ আগস্ট) ।

তাই আদিবাসী নেতাদের উচিত হবে সরকার তথা খাদেমুলের ব্যবস্থাপত্র ঘৃণাভরে প্রত্যাখান করা। খাদেমুলের সাথে কাজ করতে না পারলে তাকে ‘বাই বাই’ বলা উচিত।

Thursday, August 19, 2010

Of Constitutional Recognition for the Adivasis in Bangladesh

Like other countries of the world, the adivasis of Bangladesh celebrated the 9th August, the international day of the world’s indigenous peoples, with a theme on ‘the right to culture and identity’. The national dailies in Bangladesh published news features and analyses into the theme with due importance. At different seminars and workshops, the adivasi leaders raised a suite of demands; however, the demand of constitutional recognition has gained momentum over all of them. Although all leaders have raised voices for constitutional recognition, we are yet to be clarified of a few questions. Will the adivasi issue get priority on the list of constitutional amendments? How does the amendment look like? Is it through revision to the existing clauses or adding new clauses to the constitution? Do the adivasi leaders have a common understanding of what ‘rights for the adivasis’ could be incorporated into the constitution, while amending it?

A meeting of the Parliamentary Caucus on indigenous affairs chaired by Rashed Khan Menon, MP (middle).
Photo by Abhilash Tripura
No one can deny the fact that the list of the adivasis’ problems is long. Correspondingly the demand list is too. But all demands invariably will not be accommodated in the constitution. Given this reality, I would propose the adivasi leaders to put the constitutional recognition on the top of their priority action list during the AL-led grand alliance government’s tenure. To me, the attainment of constitutional recognition will largely depend on fulfilling the three interrelated hypotheses, which must be considered by the adivasi leaders. First, despite the parliament has the sovereign power in making laws, the constitutional recognition for the adivasis will depend on the very will of the prime minister. Hence, her consent is the first and foremost necessary. Second, the adivasi leaders must have a common understanding and consensus on what rights could be proposed to the government; and third, a strong mass people’s opinion has to be formed through making advocacy with the supportive elements including the special parliamentary body on constitutional amendment and the parliamentary caucus on indigenous issues. But the tough question is: who will ring the bell? Obviously it is the adivasi leaders, who must take the gauntlet up first.

According to the sources of different dailies, the government already has constituted a special parliamentary body on constitutional amendments with the deputy leader of the house Sajeda Chowdhury in the chair. This body is expected to start its works without delay in accordance with the Supreme Court’s judgement over the fifth constitutional amendment. It is not clear yet whether the parliamentary body will consider the adivasis’ issues other than the court’s findings and observations.

As concerns the first hypothesis, we can infer a thesis from the present Bangladesh political culture that the inclusion of constitutional recognition for the adivasis in the parliamentary body’s amendment agenda will categorically depend on the prime minister’s ‘yes’ or ‘no’. At this backdrop, all adivasi leaders, who I refer to are the five elected adivasi MPs from AL, CHT Regional Council, three Hill District Councils (HDCs) and three Circle chiefs, regardless of their political affiliation or ideological stance, have to agree on only one issue - constitutional recognition for the adivasis. They must work together to convince the prime minister into her saying ‘yes’ to this issue. At the same time, they must make concerted efforts to draw support for the issue from the special parliamentary body on constitutional amendments; the parliamentary caucus on indigenous issues; the cabinet members and leaders of the opposition, who are supportive to the adivasi cause.

It is also noteworthy that simply the prime minister’s or the special parliamentary body’s good intention will not work well. Hence, to achieve the goal of constitutional recognition will largely depend upon the well-prepared homework by the adivasi leaders.

Thus the second hypothesis stipulates that the adivasi leaders first have to do own homework. During the homework, they have to prioritise their demands. Obviously there is a long list of demands that include a roadmap for implementation of the CHT Accord; recognition as adivasi in lieu of ‘small ethnic groups’ (khudro nrigosthi); the rights to language, culture and traditional lands; reservation of seats for the three constituencies in the CHT as well as the local government councils, where the larger adivasis population lives; formation of a national commission on adivasi affairs; and a separate land commission for the adivasis in the plain regions. But the big challenge lies ahead of them is how to get these demands incorporated into the constitution? Given the long ‘wish list’, the adivasi leaders must be strategic in placing the demands to the special parliamentary body, whether it is making the amendments or revisions to the existing clauses or adding new ones to the constitution. It is high time for them to agree on ‘what rights’ will be proposed under the rubric of ‘constitutional recognition’.

In defining the strategies, the adivasi leaders might consider the example of the Indian constitution, which applied a three-pronged strategy to ensure the rights of the Scheduled Tribes (ST). These strategies are 1) protective arrangements which provide the ‘tribals’ with reserved seats in the parliament as well as local government councils, and the minority commission to protect the interests of the minority people; 2) affirmative actions that guarantee the tribal people’s rights to have access to education and employment; and 3) development resources. Under this strategy provision, the Indian government is obliged to earmark a special allocation of its national budget for the development of ‘backward’ areas.

In Bangladesh, we have got ‘affirmative action’ provisions under the clauses 28 & 29 of the constitution, but they suffer from clarity. On the other hand, the successive Bangladeshi governments did not make any laws or policies to elaborate those clauses in favour of its adivasis. Hence, it is imperative for the adivasi leaders to analyse these affirmative clauses in order to make them more favourable for the adivasis. To be more realistic in setting strategies, they must consult the constitution experts. Another aspect of the Bangladesh constitution is also notable that it does not have any provisions on the protective arrangements and development resources exclusively for the adivasis. Therefore, to enforce the rights of the adivasis, especially their collective rights over lands and resources, language and culture, and economic development, the constitution must include some provisions with special reference to the adivasi issues. To this effect, the demand for a national commission on indigenous affairs is justifiable. Simultaneously the CHT Accord must be provided with a constitutional safeguard.

The third hypothesis stipulates that the issue of constitutional recognition has to be recognised as ‘national responsibility’ not only by the adivasi leaders, but also by the ruling party Awami League and its alliances such as the Jatiya Party (JP) and the leftist parties. If the ruling party and its alliances do not feel of such responsibility, all cries for constitutional recognition by the adivasi leaders will end up to ‘wild-goose chase’. As such, the adivasi leaders must make all out efforts to draw supports from the ruling party and its alliances for constitutional recognition. Yet there are challenges ahead, as many of the ruling party’s law-makers including civil-military bureaucrats are unaware of indigenous issues or they do have prejudice against the adivasis. It is needless to explain that these civil-military bureaucrats do have more influence over the policy-making process. The political bureaucrats sometimes cannot overlook their views. Keeping this reality into account, the adivasi leaders must focus on launching multi-level ‘diplomacy’ with different political actors, civil-military bureaucrats and relevant stakeholders towards creating a congenial and favourable atmosphere rather than showing a political gimmick in the street. At this point, already there exist some favourable forces such as some friendly law-makers and cabinet members within the ruling party and the parliamentary caucus on indigenous issues headed by the progressive leftist leaders like Rashed Khan Menon MP and Hasanul Huq Inu MP, who are very much supportive to the adivasis. The adivasi leaders could capitalise on their good offices to go ahead with the ‘diplomacy’ program into forming a strong opinion for constitutional recognition; but they must first decide on the strategies collectively. However, the question is: who, among the adivasi leaders and representative organisations, will do what towards fulfilling the afore-mentioned hypotheses?

In response to the afore-mentioned question, I would propose that Bangladesh Adivasi Forum (BAF), as a representative organisation in the whole Bangladesh, must play the role of a vanguard right now. However, to ensure its political legitimacy of representation, and to chalk out a realistic program of actions, it must closely work with the indigenous people’s organisations across the country. To direct the actions into an achievable goal, BAF could consider appointing a ‘working group’ with honourable, acceptable and independent individuals who have expertise on the relevant fields. This working group should be constituted not only with indigenous persons, but also with renowned non-indigenous persons who are more sensitised with the adivasi issues. The working group could be entrusted with specific tasks such as studying the constitution and preparing a framework of ‘what rights’ could be included within the scope of ‘constitutional recognition’. If necessary, the working group could continue dialogues with the relevant stakeholders including the parliamentary bodies like the special body on constitutional amendments, and the parliamentary caucus on indigenous affairs. In addition to the working group, the adivasi leaders could nominate a respectable and impartial person as a ‘goodwill ambassador’, who will act as a bridge between the policy-makers in the government and the opposition party and the adivasi leaders. Thus he or she will help to draw supports for the constitutional recognition by reducing the differences between them. To bring all these ideas into action, BAF should take hold of the steering in the drive of constitutional recognition of the adivasis.

The present government has some three years to go. At this point of time, the adivasi leaders bear in mind that all, whatever they wish to do, have to be accomplished during the present government’s tenure. If they miss the chance, the dream for constitutional recognition likely will never come to true; because no one can guarantee an adivasi friendly government with such absolute majority, as the present government has had it, in the future. Another point to note is that the demand for constitutional recognition of the adivasis is not a brainchild of BAF, PCJSS or UPDF, but it is an aspiration which is a precondition for establishing an inclusive democracy and thereby establishing a just and equitable society in Bangladesh on the whole. Therefore, the common adivasis now long for an ideal situation, where the adivasi leaders regardless of their political ideology or political affiliation with AL, BNP, PCJSS or UPDF, and giving up all their egos and personal disliking to each other, speak together in one voice – the “constitutional recognition for the adivasis now or never”. We are eagerly looking forward to their historic role at this juncture of history.

Tuesday, August 3, 2010

"SAVE US FROM TOTAL EXTERMINATION" - A NON-STOP REVERBERATION ON MY MIND

Today I was surfing on internet. Suddenly I came across a few photos posted on the Flickr by International Work Group on Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA). Many photos were placed up on there. One of the folders contained photos exclusively from the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), Bangladesh. I was clicking on the photos one by one. To my surprise, I got a few photos of jumma refugee camp at Thakumbari, Tripura state of India. These photos were taken by Jenneke Arens. A lot of thanks go to Jenneke for the photos.

By seeing these photos I lost in reverie and got 20 years back to 1990, when I was a refugee boy at Thakumbari refugee camp in Tripura state of India. I clearly remembered and visualised the long sheds, where we refugees spent our days in inhuman condition. I forgot the exact date, but I still remembered that day in 1990, when a team from the Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission visited the refugee camps in Tripura. Then I was a boy and student of class eight. The name of our school was 'Thakumbari Refugee Camp Model High School'. Our Headmaster was Akshoy Moni Chakma. I clearly remembered, our Headmaster got us, the students make a dais on the school premises.

Next to the school there was a hostel for students. As there was no environment for study at home (actually congested long sheds), many students (mainly the boys) used to live in the hostel. Shri Monoj (Subesh Kumar Chakma), a PCJSS leader who was posted in Thakumbari refugee camp, was there for full-time to look after the students. I called him Aju (grandfather). I learned English and Bengali grammar with him. He was very fond of me. He encouraged and inspired me a lot to study more and more. He used to explain the motto, "knowledge is power" and many other things.

Shri Monoj acted not only as a hostel super, but also a guardian for the students. He lived in a small bamboo house next to the hostel. He used to help the students with learning. He was a very strict hostel super. Every body had to follow the house-keeping rules very strictly. If anyone, who breached any rule, could not escape a hard punishment. Out of both fear and respect of him, students paid attention to their studies. I strongly believe, no one of the students of that time would forget him.

I clearly remembered, Shri Monoj used to be busy with writing memorandum and the messages for the placards, if any high profile delegation, ministers or dignitaries were due to refugee camp. I visualised that scene that prior to the CHT Commission team's visit to Thakumbari refugee camp, Shri Monoj called in a few students, who had good handwriting, to write the slogans up on the placards. I was one of them. Some wrote the slogans on white paper sheets, while some others fixed those pieces of papers with the bamboo sticks. We wrote many slogans. Still I remembered the slogan I wrote, "SAVE US FROM TOTAL EXTERMINATION" on the pieces of plain paper sheets. Today, the photo below reminded me of the memories of twenty years back. That time, I did not understand the meaning of 'extermination'. So, I had to consult a dictionary to get the meaning of it. Since then I have never forgot this word.

jumma children in Thakumbari refugee camp holding placards:"save us from total extermination",
"save humanity in CHT", Tripura state, India, photo: Jenneke Arens, IWGIA (1990).
On the day when the CHT Commission visited Thakumbari refugee camp, we the students along with other mass people stood in queues on two sides of the road. There were long queues. Children greeted the CHT Commission team in a traditional way of greetings by folding two hands (see the photo below).

jumma children greeting the CHT Commission in Thakumbari refugee camp
photo: Jenneke Arens, IWGIA (1990).
I can still visualise the faces of people. There was so much ethusiasm among refugees that 'foreigners' were coming to see the situation on the spot; what a sub-human life the refugees were leading in the camps. They had an expectation that those foreigners would put up the sufferings of refugees to the 'world community'. They had an expectation that the 'world community' would come forward to rescue the refugees, and indigenous jumma people from the clutch of oppression by the Bangladesh army and the Bengali settlers in the CHT of Bangladesh. The placard reads, "REPEAL DISTRICT COUNCIL IN CHT". The then military-backed Ershad government introduced the Local Government Council for three hill districts in 1989 against the will of the CHT people; while PCJSS opposed the Local Government Council. In this backdrop, there were high level of tensions, and conflicts across the whole CHT. Indigenous people were displaced in thousands. Many of them were compelled to take refuge in Tripura state of India. There was a strong demand for cancellation of the local government council system. 

In the eye of my mind, I still can see the scene of the meeting held on the refugee camp high school premises between the CHT Commission team and Jumma Refugee Welfare Association led by Upendra Lal Chakma, former MP. On behalf of the refugees, Akshoy Moni Chakma, Headmaster of the Thakumbari Refugee Camp Model High School read out the memorandum to the CHT Commission; while Upendra Lal Chakma spoke on the situation of the CHT. People gathered there in thousands on the school premises. We, the students of the high school were also present. I did not understand English that much. I did not understand what Upendral Lal Chakma said in his speech, except a few words and sentences. I understood one few sentences, which Upendra Lal Chakma uttered emotionally, "we the jumma people are on the verge of total extermination"; "Save us from total extermination." That day, I did not understand English that much, but I got inspired from Upendra Lal Chakma to learn English.  

Late Upendra Lal Chakma, former MP and Chairman of the Jumma Refugee Welfare Association,
Photo: Japan CHT Committee.
Upendra Lal Chakma is no more in this world, but his leadership role for the greater interest of the jumma refugees should never be blurred. He will be remembered by jumma refugees with due respect for good. 

Today, by seeing the photos on IWGIA's Flickr, I turned to be nostalgic. I was wondering whether anybody had taken photos of the long long sheds (known as shibir, not home), where the jumma refugees spent their days in inhuman condition, which was not worthy for living. At those sheds,  the jumma refugees shed their tears in sorrows and pains. The jumma refugees spent many days and nights with family members by starving, and sometimes half-fed. I saw, many lost their beloved ones there. Those long shibirs now could tell many stories of weal and woes of refugee life. I asked to myself: "did any jumma took snaps of those long shibirs? If anybody did so, would he or she share some photos with us? If I get those photos, I could show them to my future generations; I could tell them the stories and history of being refugee in Tripura state of India. Is there anybody to provide the historical elements for jumma history?     

Today I have remembered again: I lost my home long ago; as of today I am like a refugee, and a homeless person. Still I cannot forget the jumma children's cry, "SAVE US FROM TOTAL EXTERMINATION". 
  

Cashew nuts, a promising cash crop in the hill tracts of Bangladesh*

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