The right to self-determination is a universal human right applicable for all including indigenous peoples. This right has been recognised in international laws such as ICCPR and IESCR. Recently the UN explicitly has recognized the indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination through the adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). However, many States tend to interpret the right to self-determination in traditional decolonization context i.e. secession or independence. They argue that indigenous peoples do not qualify for the right to self-determination. As such, the denial of indigenous self-determination has given rise to the armed resistance or insurgencies against many States across the world.
In the context, this paper examines the struggle for reclaiming the rights to self-determination of indigenous peoples in Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), Bangladesh Bangladesh denied the indigenous rights in the Bangladesh
Following the state’s outright denial of self-determination and their distinct identities, indigenous peoples of CHT organised themselves under a political platform and they demanded autonomy with constitutional guarantee. The State considered the indigenous autonomy movement as a threat to the national sovereignty and independence. Consequently the nation state of Bangladesh
To resist the repressive government move of the GoB, the PCJSS, an indigenous political party, continued guerrilla war against the government since the mid ‘70s onwards. Although indigenous leaders took resort to an armed resistance, they did not claim independence or secession from Bangladesh Bangladesh
Finally, the GoB realized the importance of political solution to indigenous problem through dialogues with indigenous leaders. This negotiation resulted in a peace agreement, called the CHT Accord, by ending the armed conflict in 1997.
Through the Accord, the GoB has recognised regional autonomy, under which it has created special governance institutions such as special ministry, one regional council and three hill district councils with indigenous leadership. The GoB has recognised indigenous political representation in state affairs, and their economic, social and cultural development through these institutions, but due to lack of political support of the central government these indigenous led institutions have not been able yet to fully exercise their authority for own development.
Therefore, it follows that, to implement the right to self-determination of indigenous peoples largely depends on the political will of the state, and the rights are determined through political process, in which the State has the upper-hand.
1.1 background of the research problem
The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) of Bangladesh comprising three Hill Districts namely Rangamati, Khagrachari and Bandarban in the south-eastern region is a home to eleven indigenous communities[1] with a population of approximately 0.7 million. Immediately after independence of Bangladesh Pakistan and the present nation-state of Bangladesh
Before the advent of British colonisation, the indigenous peoples of CHT were ‘internally supreme and externally free’ under the leadership of the traditional kings (Larma, 2003:1), but through annexation of CHT with the British colony the authority of the traditional kings had been curtailed by the colonial rulers. However, the colonial rulers retained the indigenous self-rule system under certain legislative measures such as the CHT Regulation 1900[3] (ibid). Following the departure of the colonial rulers, CHT came under Pakistan Pakistan in 1971, the rulers of newly independent Bangladesh Bangladesh was made a “unilingual and unicultural nation state”, without any reference to ethnic nationalities in Bangladesh
This assimilationist approach to nation-building had been challenged by M.N. Larma, then only indigenous MP in the parliament. He demanded constitutional recognition of the indigenous peoples while a constitution was in the making for the newly independent Bangladesh 16 February 1972 an indigenous delegation led by M. N. Larma placed four-point demands including autonomy for CHT with constitutional guarantee to the then president and the ‘father of the nation’ Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Larma, 2003; Zaman, 1981; Husain, 1997). Instead of listening to their demands, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman asked the delegation to merge into the Bangali by discarding own ethnic identities (CHTC, 1991:14).
Consequently this non-recognition of indigenous rights led to formation of an indigenous political party PCJSS under the leadership of M.N. Larma. In defiance of Bengali nationalism, PCJSS constructed a political and territorial identity jumma to unify all indigenous groups in CHT under one social umbrella (Dewan, 2010:11; Van-Schedel, 1992: 121). PCJSS has set the “rights to self-determination with constitutional guarantee” as one of its objectives towards establishing the indigenous rights in CHT (PCJSS, n.d).
In response to the demand for autonomy, interchangeably self-determination, the state adopted two strategies: “militarisation and flooding the CHT region with landless Bengalis from the plains” (Arens and Chakma, 2002; Chakma, 2010). The government increased military forces across CHT. At the same time, Bengali settlers from outside were brought into CHT under the government sponsorship – thus making the conflict between the indigenous people and Bengalis from bad to the worse. As a counter response, PCJSS launched its military wing Shanti Bahini[5] since 1976 to resist the Bangladesh
To end the long-standing armed conflict politically, the Bangladesh December 2, 1997 . The Accord does not include any term ‘autonomy’ or ‘self-determination’ conspicuously; nonetheless it has provided a basis for a limited ‘regional autonomy’ in CHT. Despite the prospect of autonomy, during the last 12 year period, the CHT institutions constituted within the framework of the Accord have not been empowered to exercise their power and functions properly due to non-cooperation of the central government (Larma, 2003).
1.2 research questions addressed
Considering the afore-mentioned background, this paper examines the question: how indigenous leaders have conceptualised and used the concept of the right to self-determination of indigenous peoples in CHT within the nation-state of Bangladesh
1.3 methodology
This study mainly has been based on the secondary sources of data. Necessary literature has been collected from various sources, which could be categorised into two: first, academic journal articles and books; and second, reports, statements and legal documents published by various human rights organisations, political parties, UN agencies and development organisations and the dailies from Bangladesh
For conceptual clarity and theoretical understanding of self-determination, necessary academic journals, books and UN documents, especially the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) have been reviewed. These documents are mostly collected from online sources.
To understand the indigenous struggle for the right of self-determination in CHT, as much as possible the resources on CHT issues have been reviewed. The main sources of data were journal articles, seminar papers, dailies and reports and statements published by human rights organisations and political parties, largely by PCJSS. To complement secondary data with primary data, the researcher had opportunity to discuss with a few indigenous leaders and activists over telephone and emails. However, the large portion of data collected from secondary sources.
1.4 literature review
There is a dearth of literature in the area of self-determination movement in CHT. Yet the researcher has made attempts to collect key literature from the three sources: reports human rights organisations; articles and reports from political parties and dailies; and journal articles. The materials from the first and second sources abound, but they have largely focused on human rights situations in CHT. A good number of rights organisations such as the Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission (CHTC), Unrepresented People’s Organisation (UNPO), and Amnesty International (AI) have regularly produced reports on the CHT situation, with a particular focus on human rights issues.
Out of the second sources, the PCJSS’ Information Department, in particular, published useful articles by Uttaran (1985), Jimi (1985) and Larma (2003). These authors provided the details of the CHT history and alienation processes of indigenous rights under various regimes from the British colonial rules to the present Bangladesh Bangladesh
From the third sources, the key materials were the journal articles written by academics. Among them Islam (1981), Zaman (1982), Ahsan and Chakma (1989), Van-Schendel (1992), Husain (1997), Islam (2003), Mohsin (2003), Rashiduzzaman (1998), Roy (2005), Jamil and Pandey (2009) and Chakma (2010) are notable. Authors, who wrote before the CHT Accord of 1997, made attempts to diagnose the insurgency problem of CHT. Islam, Zaman, Ahsan and Chakma, and Husain identified the problem as a ‘national integrational’ crisis; while Van-Schendel examined the socio-cultural factors that gave rise to ‘jumma nationalism’, which, in turn, united different indigenous groups against the mainstream Bengali nationalism. Van-Schendel concludes that ‘jumma’ identity rejects the Bengali cultural model, and hence, the identity issue of indigenous peoples has to be taken into account by anyone while resolving the CHT crisis.
In the post-Accord period, most of the authors like Pandey and Jamil, and Mohsin analysed the causes of non-implementation of CHT Accord. They demonstrate that peace in CHT remains elusive due to the ‘top-down’ nature of the peace Accord. Mohsin, by analysing the economic and political marginalisation process of indigenous peoples, argues that the peace deal itself is hegemonic imposed by the hegemonic state without, addressing the root causes e.g. resolution of land disputes and Bengali settlement. The hegemonic policy of the State has to be changed to ensure peace and development in CHT.
Chakma demonstrates that the demand for autonomy has emerged from the state’s assimilationist and homogenising approach to nation-building. Immediately after independence in 1971, the ruling elites of Bangladesh
In the post-Accord period, the government of Bangladesh
Thus from the foregoing literature review, it is clear that the authors have not examined the indigenous people’s right to self-determination from theoretical and empirical aspects – how the indigenous peoples rights could be accommodated in the state system of Bangladesh Bangladesh
1.5 structure of the report
This section examines the concepts of self-determination followed by the indigenous people’s perspectives on self-determination. In doing so, this section will discuss: first, the evolution of the concept of self-determination; second, the scope of the right to self-determination in international laws, third, the debates on the right to self-determination between the States and indigenous peoples; fourth, indigenous rights to self-determination substantiated with a few examples of practices for indigenous peoples in other countries of the world.
2.1 the evolution of the concept of self-determination: from principle to right
Initially the concept of self-determination was a ‘principle’ for liberation of people. Now it has become a ‘right’ in international human rights laws.
The origin of self-determination dates back to the eighteen century, particularly during the American Declaration of Independence in 1776 and the French Revolution in 1789 (Cassese, 1995; Barnsley and Bleiker, 2008). Later Lenin first systematically expounded the principle of self-determination as a criterion for liberation peoples from imperialism (Cassese, 1995:14). According to Lenin, this principle had three components: first, self-determination could be applied for ethnic or national groups who intended to decide own destiny freely; second, this would be applied during the aftermath of military conflicts between sovereign states for allocation of territories to one or another Power; and third, it was an anti-colonial postulate for liberation of all colonial countries (ibid). Contrary to Lenin, the US Wilson
Following the establishment of League of Nations , the principle of self-determination had been a key concept of international relations. That time, self-determination was considered from the perspectives of sovereignty i.e. ‘peoples’ would be allowed to be free from external domination (Barnsley and Bleiker, 2008: 124).
Eventually with the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, the ‘principle’ of self-determination evolved into a ‘right’. For example, the UN Charter first includes self-determination as a principle to establish friendly relations among nations. Later this ‘principle’ was translated into a ‘right’ in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (IESCR) adopted by the UN in 1966. Both covenants have a common Article 1, which has recognised self-determination as a human right and it stipulates that:
All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
By incorporating self-determination into ICCPR and IESCR, UN recognises it as both political right, and economic, social and cultural rights for all peoples.
2.2 the scope of the right to self-determination
As soon as ICCPR and IESCR have come into force, every State is legally bound to implement the right to self-determination, but how and by whom this right will be exercised is very much contested in international politics. The debates are centred on a good number of factors, such as who are the right-holders (“peoples”); does self-determination mean secession or integration or both and so forth, which have not been conspicuously addressed in international laws. However, to implement the right to self-determination, the UN Human Rights Committees on ICCPR and IESCR have interpreted self-determination in two aspects - external and internal (Cassese, 1995).
In general, the external aspect of self-determination applies to decolonisation context, and in some cases, to Non-Self-Governing Territories listed under Chapter XI of the UN Charter. However, to exercise the external aspect of self-determination i.e. to freely determine political status in Non-Self-Governing Territories depends on the ‘freely expressed will’ of the people concerned whether they choose to do so through creation of an independent state, or through the establishment of an association with an independent state or integration with an independent state (UN, 1960: principle vi). Henricksen (2001) argues that the external aspect of self-determination does not necessarily mean secession, but that too depends on how a State performs its duty towards a distinct people within its boundary. If a State progressively violates its obligation toward a people, it loses its legitimacy to rule over them. In that case, secession is considered to be an ultimate option for exercising the external aspect of self-determination. For instance, many States such as Bangladesh gained independence from Pakistan
By contrast, the internal aspect of self-determination does not necessarily relate to decolonisation. In essence, it refers to the right to authentic self-government, by which a people can freely pursue its economic, social and cultural development (Cassese, 1995; and Henricksen, 2001). As such, with decolonisation or following independence of a new State, the right of the internal aspect of self-determination does not diminish; rather it is an ongoing right. Hence, the internal aspect of self-determination also refers to the right to exercise cultural, linguistic, religious, territorial or political autonomy within the boundaries of the existing State (Henricksen, 2001 and 1999).
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the right to self-determination of all “peoples” firmly has been recognised in international law. As a universal human right, this right – whether external or internal – must be applied to all equally without discrimination. However, the indigenous people’s claim to the right to self-determination has been contested by many States at the UN forums. The major debates have centred on certain issues such as: who are “peoples” as mentioned in the ICCPR and IESCR? Do indigenous peoples deserve to be “peoples” to claim the right to self-determination? If they do, what aspects – external or internal - of self-determination do they deserve? Does the indigenous right to self-determination threaten the territorial integrity of the States? And so forth. The following section makes an attempt to address these questions.
2.3 the debates on the right to self-determination: the state-centred approach versus indigenoue people’s views
Although ICCPR and IESCR have used the term ‘peoples’ as the holder of the right to self-determination, no international law has defined who are “peoples”. As such, in the absence of a clear definition, many States tend to define “peoples” from various perspectives to restrict the application of the right to self-determination for indigenous peoples. For example, one group holds that self-determination applies only to those “peoples” who are under conditions of classical colonialism; while the other group holds that “peoples” refers to the aggregate populations of independent states, as well as peoples in colonial territories. However, Anaya (2004:103) disapproves such state-centred conceptions of “peoples” as they are problematic from human rights perspectives, and are not consistent with the core values of the concept of self-determination – freedom and equality of all human beings.
In contrast to the state-centred conceptions, Henricksen (2001:8) provides the key features that constitute “peoples”, who are a group of individual human beings who enjoy some of the following common features: (1) a common historical tradition; (2) ethnic identity; (3) cultural homogeneity; (4) linguistic unity; (5) religious or ideological affinity; (5) territorial connection; and (6) common economic life. Henricksen also argues there must be ‘will’ or ‘consciousness’ to be a people, and institutions to express the identity of the people.
2.3.2 who are ‘indigenous peoples’? do they deserve the right to self-determination as ‘peoples’?
Like the term ‘peoples’, there is no consensus on the definition of ‘indigenous peoples’. However, many international organisations such as ILO and UNPFII have set key criteria to identify indigenous peoples instead of adopting an official definition. ILO Convention No. 169, in its Article 1.1 (b), defines indigenous peoples as:
Peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions.
This definition of ILO includes a list of common characteristics to identify indigenous peoples. They include colonisation or conquest of indigenous territories by outsiders; and distinct social, economic, cultural and political institutions to retain own identities. Similarly, the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) has set a list of common features to identify indigenous peoples such as: (1) self-identification as indigenous peoples; (2) historical continuity with pre-colonial and/or pre-settler societies; (3) strong link to territories and surrounding natural resources; (4) distinct social, economic and political systems; (5) distinct language, culture and belief; (6) form non-dominant groups of society; (7) resolve to maintain and reproduce their ancestral environments and systems as distinct peoples and communities (UNPFII, n.d).
Thus in terms of criteria as proffered by ILO and UNPFII’s, indigenous peoples can satisfy all conditions of ‘peoples’ and as ‘peoples’ they can claim the right to self-determination. From the perspectives of human rights norms too, they are entitled to the right to self-determination, because human rights are universally applicable for all without any discrimination. Moreover, the right of self-determination as a collective human right is very essential for the survival of indigenous peoples.
However, many States are reluctant to accept indigenous peoples as “peoples”. They argue that term “peoples” refers only to colonised peoples or the whole populations of independent States. As such, the right of self-determination does not apply to indigenous peoples.
By refusing such statist argument, Anaya (2004) claims from human rights approach that indigenous peoples are entitled to the right of self-determination in two aspects: substantive aspects and remedial aspects. According to Anaya, the substantive aspect of self-determination consists of two normative strains: constitutive aspect and on-going aspect; where the former aspect requires that the governing institutional order be substantially the creation of processes guided by the will of the people or peoples, governed. That is, the constitutive aspect is about ‘creation and change of a political order’ e.g. ‘authentic government’ freely determined by the people. While on-going self-determination relates to the institutional order that enables individuals and groups to make meaningful choices in matters touching upon all spheres of life on continuous basis i.e. people are able to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
Anaya’s second aspect is remedial self-determination, which refers to prescription necessary to implement the norm or violation of the norm. In other words, indigenous peoples are entitled to remedial aspect of self-determination in that they suffered from the denial of the substantive aspects of self-determination.
In essence, as argued by Anaya, that indigenous peoples being culturally differentiated groups have been deprived of their substantive rights and suffered violations due to an oppressive form of governance during colonisation. In many cases, their deprivation has not changed even after decolonisation due to colonial legacy in the administrations, under which they live. Therefore, to benefit all, the right of self-determination must equally apply for all segments of humanity including indigenous peoples.
2.3.3 territorial integrity and Indigenous self-determination: the states versus indigenoue peoples?
With regards to the right to self-determination of indigenous peoples, many States have raised concerns over territorial integrity. They reject such right for indigenous peoples on that ground that it may encourage secession and separatism (Castelino and Gilbert, 2003), but indigenous peoples do hold different view. According to some authors, such as Henricksen and Anaya, this statist view is solely based on the traditional decolonisation context, vis-à-vis the external aspect of self-determination, which obscures the human rights character of self-determination norm.
Against the state-centred view of territorial integrity, indigenous peoples consider self-determination from a human rights approach, which does not necessarily involve creation of a new State. First, they view the right to self-determination must be applied equally for all peoples without discrimination. Second, in implementing self-determination, the States must recognise distinct identities of indigenous peoples and their collective rights over land and resources, among others, towards full enjoyment of human rights of indigenous peoples (Lindroth, 2006). Thus territorial integrity cannot be a limitation to the enjoyment of indigenous self-determination. Lâm (2000:135) rightly puts this matter as follows: “indigenous peoples see themselves neither as states nor as fungible citizens, but as distinctive collectivities that must be simultaneously accorded some state-like powers as well as human rights protections”.
The UN first ever has expressly recognised their right to self-determination by adopting a Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in 2007. The UNDRIP in its Article 3 clearly states:
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
In the same manner, as it was done in the ICCPR and IESCR, the UN has recognised the indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination in UNDRIP. Article 3 of the UNDRIP by itself indicates that indigenous peoples’ rights are not separate from human rights. Like other peoples, indigenous peoples are also entitled to enjoy two normative sets of rights: a) to freely determine political status; and b) to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. However, how these rights will be implemented stand out as a big challenge. One of the big challenges is that many States tend to interpret indigenous self-determination as a threat to territorial integrity and sovereignty.
Contrary to the statist view, indigenous peoples interpret their right to self-determination as the right “that gives them the right to be in control of their own lives and their own destiny” (Henricksen, 2001:14). In other words, indigenous self-determination does not necessarily mean secession or independence, rather it is a right by which indigenous peoples can gain greater control over own lives and destiny.
2.4 the indigenous right to self-DETERMINATION: example of practices
The UNDRIP (Article 4) provides mechanisms for implementing the indigenous right to self-determination through either autonomy or self-government. In practice, how autonomy or self-government has been operationalised is examined below.
Many States across the world have implemented autonomy or self-government arrangements for indigenous peoples. These measures were laid down in the State’s constitution or the treaties between the States and indigenous peoples. For example, the Indian constitutions in its Sixth Schedule makes provisions for autonomous states, and where applicable, Autonomous Districts Councils (ADCs) for the ‘tribal people’ in the states of Tripura, Meghalaya, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh (Roy, 2009). While in many countries of the world, indigenous peoples have signed treaties or accords with the States. Within the frameworks of those treaties, indigenous peoples have been enjoying the right to exercise self-determination through self-governments, for example, the Treaty of Waitangi of 1840 in New Zealand and the Self-government Agreement of 1991 with indigenous Inuit people of Nunavut in Canada
By examining the nature of autonomy and self-government practices in Asia, Europe and the Artic region, Henricksen (2001:18) has identified four types of indigenous autonomy. These are: (1) autonomy through contemporary indigenous political institutions, such as the Sami Parliaments in the Nordic countries; (2) indigenous territorial based autonomy, such as the Comarca arrangement in Panama ; (3) regional autonomy within the States, e.g. autonomous indigenous regions in the Philippines
2.5 summary
Until the establishment of the United Nations, the concept of self-determination was a ‘principle’ to be free from imperialism or foreign domination. The UN in its Charter formally recognised this ‘principle’ to establish friendly relations between the States.
Subsequently, the principle of self-determination has turned into a ‘right’ through the adoption of ICCPR and IESCR. The right to self-determination has two aspects – external, which relates to freely determining political status; and other one is internal self-determination related to freely pursuing own economic, social and cultural development.
However, implementation of self-determination has been very contentious, as many States tend to question the indigenous people’s eligibility to be as ‘peoples’ and concerns over territorial integrity. Whereas indigenous peoples claim that they are “peoples” in all aspects of self-determination, and hence equally with other “peoples”, indigenous peoples also are eligible for right to self-determination. Therefore, their claim legally has been endorsed by the UNDRIP.
Yet implementation of the right to self-determination of indigenous peoples has been a big challenge, because the establishment of an effective national mechanism on indigenous self-determination largely depends on the ‘will’ of the States. Without political ‘will’ and support from the States the implementation of the indigenous people’s right to self-determination is almost impossible.
According to Henricksen, the right of self-determination is not a “pre-determined outcome” but it is a “process right”. Thus it follows that the right of self-determination has to be individually defined through a process of dialogue between the States and indigenous peoples concerned, provided that both parties can sit together with mutual respect and trust to each other.
By drawing on Henricksen’s view, it can be said that the Bangladesh Bangladesh Bangladesh
This section examines the roots causes of the indigenous people’s movement for the right of self-determination in CHT, Bangladesh Bangladesh
3.1 indigenous peoples and identities
CHT is a home to eleven indigenous peoples namely Chakma, Marma, Tripura, Tanchangya, Murong, Bawm, Chak, Khumi, Khyang, Lushai, Pangkhua other than the Bengalis. They are different from the majority Bengali populations in terms of physical appearances, languages, culture and religion. Even within indigenous groups, there are differences in various aspects. Among them Chakma, Marma and Tripura make up the majority with a population of 442,880 (90% of the total indigenous population), while numerically the most minority communities are the Chak (2000), Khumi (1241) and Lushai (662) (Jamil and Pandey, 2008, and Adnan, 2004). By religion, the Chakma, Marma, Tanchangya, and Chak are Buddhists, while Tripuras follow Hinduism. Other communities such as Bawm, Khyang, Khumi, Lushai and Pangkhua are Christian. The Murong retain the traditional beliefs, but are influenced by Buddhism (Adnan, 2004:11).
To identify them, several terms variously have been used. In the official documents, ‘tribal’ is widely written by the government officials to refer indigenous communities as a whole, while laws and policies pertaining to CHT used several terms such as ‘indigenous hillmen’, ethnic minority/adivasi (indigenous peoples) and ‘small ethnic groups’ for identifying them. In common parlance Pahari (hill people) is popularly used both by indigenous and non-indigenous people. Following a resurgence of indigenous movement in 1970s, jumma nation or jumma people was popularised by PCJSS to identify all indigenous peoples collectively in CHT (Van-schendel, 2001 and 1992). Out of shared history of oppression and common cultural traditions, jumma identity has created a renaissance among them into the protection of their own cultural distinctness and way of life which are different from the majority Bengalis.
3.2 indigenous rights under different regimes
3.2.1 the british colonial rules
The British colonisation has brought about major changes in the configuration of political power in CHT. In 1760, the British East India Company took over the charge of CHT, but it could not establish absolute authority without resistance. The Chakma King Jan Bux Khan challenged the Company’s authority over CHT. As a result, the British had to fight with the Chakma king for more than one decade from 1776 to 1787 to bring CHT region within their control. Finally, as the British imposed economic embargo on CHT, the Chakma King had to enter into a treaty of peace with the British Governor General in 1787 (Roy
Subsequently the colonial rulers adopted various means to consolidate their power over CHT. First, in 1860 they declared CHT as an autonomous administrative district to strengthen their supervisory authority over the region (Larma, 2003:1, Roy, 2000: 43). Second, to curtail the authority of the traditional kings the whole CHT was divided into three Circles under three indigenous rajas (kings) – the Chakma, the Bohmong and the Mong[6]. Third, they made a set of rules for the administration of CHT, e.g. the CHT Regulation I of 1900. This regulation, served two purposes for the colonial rulers. On one hand, under the CHT Regulation of 1900, they consolidated their power over all executive, judicial and financial matters in CHT (Van-Schendel, 1992; Adnan, 2004). On the other hand, it protected the interests of indigenous peoples by declaring CHT as an Excluded Area[7] (Roy
3.2.2 the pakistan
With the departure of the British in 1947, CHT was ceded to Pakistan India , which was more secular and democratic than Pakistan India , from the very beginning the Pakistan
Eventually the Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan
3.2.3 the bangladesh
M.N Larma, then only indigenous Member of Parliament (MP) challenged such as a narrow state building approach. Being worried about the future of indigenous peoples, he made all possible efforts to get constitutional recognition of the rights and distinct identities of indigenous peoples in the newly independent Bangladesh
Simultaneously he represented to various policy-makers of the State. As part of this effort, an indigenous delegation led by M.N. Larma called on Sheikh Mujibar Rahman, the founder of Bangladesh , and for the first time they placed four point demands to him on 16 February 1972 for safeguarding indigenous rights in the constitution of Bangladesh
(1) Autonomy with own legislature for CHT;
(2) A statutory provision similar to CHT Regulation 1900 in the constitution for the safeguard of indigenous peoples;
(3) Retention of the administrative set up of the traditional kings (rajas); and
(4) A constitutional guarantee not to make amendments on matters relating to the CHT without prior consent of indigenous peoples.
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman rejected all the demands outright on the ground that autonomy and recognition of many distinct identities would not be possible in one country. Instead of listening to the delegation, he advised them to merge into the Bangalis:
No, we are all Bengalis. We cannot have two systems of government. Forget your ethnic identity, be Bengalis (CHTC, 1991:14).
Thus the State’s vehement rejection of the indigenous people’s demands compelled them to form own political party towards establishing own rights. Consequently PCJSS was formed under the leadership of M.N Larma, which launched an armed struggle against the government of Bangladesh
3.3 indigenous people’s understanding of self-determination in cht
The key literature reviewed on CHT issues demonstrates that indigenous leaders represented by PCJSS never claimed independence for CHT. Rather they aspired “to maintain their distinct national, cultural and ethnic identity and manifest in their own way” with the constitutional recognition (Uttaran, 1985:13). Hence, although it took resort to an armed struggle, PCJSS always kept the door open for a peaceful dialogue with the GoB.
As discussed in the foregoing sections, indigenous peoples had lost their political voice in the decision-making processes at the State level on one hand, and on the other hand, the safeguards of their rights completely had been ignored by the State. As such, PCJSS conceptualised the indigenous right to self-determination as means of regaining indigenous political voice and the safeguards of their rights in the constitution of Bangladesh
(1) To accord Provincial Autonomy for the CHT with its own legislature;
(2) To make constitutional provisions prohibiting any constitutional change regarding CHT without consent of the CHT people and preventing anyone from other parts of country from settling down in CHT;
(3) To remove from CHT all those illegal outsiders who have infiltrated into CHT from 17 August 1947 ;
(4) To make special economic plans for the development of the indigenous people of the CHT;
(5) To create favourable climate for a peaceful and political solution of the crisis in the CHT.
Each of these demands has been detailed into other complimentary demands (see appendix A).
3.4 the government’s response to the demand for the right to self-determination
The GoB interpreted the five-point demands as contrary to the “unitary character” of the State (Anon., 1998). Consequently, the State considered the indigenous movement for autonomy as a threat to the sovereignty and independence of the country (Larma, 2003 and Chakma, 2010a). To respond the indigenous autonomy movement, the GoB adopted a good number measures, of them the three were most radical: militarisation; in-migration and Islamisation, which affected indigenous peoples adversely (Uttaran, 1985; Larma, 2003; Chakma, 2005 and Chakma, 2010 a).
The Bangladesh
In aid of the military forces, the government undertook population transfer program, which adversely affected indigenous people’s lives. According to PCJSS and CHT Commission (1994:26) sources, the government in three phases – 1st phase (1978 – 81), 2nd phase (1981 – 1982) and 3rd phase (1982 – 1984) brought more than 400,000 Bengali settlers from the plain districts into CHT. This population transfer program served the purpose of “ethnic cleansing” in two ways: eviction and land grabbing; and total extermination e.g. massacres jointly perpetrated by the army and settlers (Chakma, 2010a and 2010b). On one hand, being backed by the army and civil administration, the Bengali settlers forcefully occupied lands from indigenous villagers. On the other hand, the Bengali settlers and the military forces jointly carried out more than one dozen systematic massacres and communal attacks on indigenous peoples in between 1971 to 1993 (PCJSS, 2005; Chakma, 2010b). As a result, thousands of people, mostly indigenous, got killed and displaced from their ancestral lands.
According to Chakma (2005) and Chakma (2010a), to encounter insurgency the Bangladesh government adopted Islamisation policy aimed at transforming CHT, the only non-Muslim area, into a Muslim dominant area (see table 1). In 1951, indigenous population comprises 90.91% against the 9.09% of the Bengali population. These figures drastically changed between 1981 and 1991, when indigenous population turned into nearly a minority in their own land. Interestingly, the recent 2001 Population Census does not include disaggregated data between indigenous and non-indigenous population.
Table 1: population composition in CHT
Year
|
Indigenous
|
Bengali
| ||
Number
|
%
|
Number
|
%
| |
1951
|
261538
|
90.91
|
26150
|
9.09
|
1956
|
300000
|
90.91
|
30000
|
9.09
|
1981
|
455000
|
61.07
|
290000
|
38.93
|
1991
|
501144
|
51.43
|
473301
|
48.57
|
Source: Adnan, 2004: 15
To sum up, the cumulative effects of these policies of the government had been so adverse that the lives and culture of indigenous peoples reached to a point of total extinction. Under these circumstances, indigenous peoples did not have alternative options but to fight with arms. After more than two decade-long armed fighting, the GoB negotiated with PCJSS for peace and that peace process culminated into a peace agreement on 2 December 1997 (see section 4).
Section 4:Indigenous people’s right to self-determination and The CHT accord
The International Forum on Globalization, 2007, p. 15.
This section examines the extent of autonomy, interchangeably the right to self-determination of indigenous peoples guaranteed in the CHT Accord. To elaborate the key issues of the right to self-determination in the context of CHT, this section discusses: the original demands of PCJSS for the right to self-determination and the reactions of the State; the rights guaranteed in the CHT Accord; and the obstacles to the implementation of the Accord.
4.1 Indigenous people’s demands: external or internal self-determination?
The indigenous movement emerged from the denial of indigenous rights by the successive regimes – from the colonial State to the present Bangladesh Bangladesh
While claiming the right to self-determination, indigenous leaders defend their position in several aspects. First, indigenous peoples of CHT have own distinct ‘national integrity and identities’, which are central to the “existence” of every ‘nation’. In other words, they argue that indigenous peoples, although numerically small nations, have the right to maintain own identities, languages and culture like the majority Bengalis. Second, the historical continuity of indigenous self-rule in CHT – from the British rule to the Pakistan Bangladesh
The GoB did not accept the demand of provincial autonomy on the ground of the “unitary character” of the State. Consequently PCJSS was seen to revise its original five-point demands, in which it proposed ‘regional autonomy’ instead of ‘provincial autonomy’ to comply with the “unitary” character of Bangladesh territory of Bangladesh vis-à-vis the Bangladesh Bangladesh
On the other hand, the right to self-determination being a universal human right, no States have the right to restrict its application for indigenous peoples. As such, international laws such as the ICCPR, IESCR and the recent UNDRIP unequivocally have authorised all peoples including indigenous peoples to exercise the right to self-determination in two aspects: to freely determine political status, and to freely pursue economic, social and cultural development. Bangladesh , being a member State
However, still there are debates as to the ways of implementing this right. According to Henricksen, the right of self-determination is a “process right” rather than “pre-determined outcome” (see sections 2.4 and 2.5). Therefore, the bottom-line of this process is that self-determination individually has to be defined through a dialogue between the States and indigenous peoples concerned. In other words, the States’ pre-occupied idea of ‘independence’ or ‘secession’ cannot pave the way for solution to indigenous problems. Instead, by recognising the human rights of all human beings, the appropriate political or institutional arrangements have to be agreed upon between the State and indigenous peoples through peaceful and respectful negotiation. In this respect, UNDRIP (Article 4 of UNDRIP) have provided for mechanisms to implement the right to self-determination through “autonomy” or “self-government”, without entering into ‘independence’ or ‘secession’ debates.
In the case of CHT, indigenous leaders also persistently emphasised ‘autonomy’ towards establishing their right to self-determination within the boundary of Bangladesh 2 December 1997 between the GoB and PCJSS. Thus through signing the CHT Accord, the GoB has accepted the demand of regional autonomy for indigenous peoples in CHT.
4.2 The Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the CHT Accord
After many rounds of talks[8] between the GoB and PCJSS, the representative indigenous political party, finally a peace deal, commonly known as the CHT Peace Accord was reached by both parties on 2 December 1997 . With the signing of the CHT Accord, indigenous peoples of CHT have been able to re-establish partial regional autonomy/semi autonomous self-government (Islam, 2003 and Roy, 2004b). Under the framework of regional autonomy, the CHT Accord has addressed many of the indigenous people’s rights with regards their political representation; control over economic, social and cultural development through the special governance institutions under indigenous leadership; and the protection of land rights. The key features of these rights have been discussed in the subsequent sections.
4.2.1 Recognition of cultural distinctness of indigenous peoples
As discussed in section 3, indigenous peoples of CHT are different from the majority Bengalis in terms of ethnic identities, language, culture and religion. Hence, in order to protect the interests of indigenous peoples, the British and the Pakistani rulers had to retain the special administrative and legal status of CHT under the nomenclature of “excluded area” and “tribal area”. But after independence, in the statebuilding process of Bangladesh Bangladesh Jumma Land Bangladesh
The demand of “Jumma Land
4.2.2 Political representation of indigenous peoples
a. the ministery of chittagong hill tracts affairs
The CHT Accord (Article 19 of Part D) has provides for a Ministry on CHT affairs (MoCHTA) headed by an indigenous person. As per the Rules of Business, the MoCHTA has 19 functions (see appendix B). However, its main role is to supervise and coordinate overall development matters and administrative activities of CHT region.
At the national level, the MoCHTA has a crucial role to play for the greater interest of people in CHT. As a focal point of CHT region, it coordinates with other line ministries of the government and provides advisory support to the central government with regards to matters of CHT. It also has a role in making law on CHT issues. While at the regional level, the MoCHTA monitors and coordinates overall development activities undertaken by the CHT institutions such as the CHTRC and three HDCs, and other local government bodies.
However, according to the AITPN study (2008), in respect of development and administrative responsibility, the authority of the MoCHTA over other government line agencies and local government bodies like Upazila (sub-district) and Union Councils (the lowest tier of local governance) is not clear; because these administrative units are directly guided by their respective Ministries in Dhaka. As a result, the co-ordination and supervisory authority of the MoCHTA remains unconfirmed and unrealised.
b. the chittagong hill tracts regional council
Recognising CHT region as a ‘unique political and administrative unit’ the CHT Accord provides for the establishment of the CHT Regional Council with an objective to coordinate and supervise the activities of the three Hill District Councils (HDCs) and other government institutions in three hill districts of CHT. The CHTRC is constituted with 22 members, of them 12 members including 2 female members are from indigenous communities and the rest are non-indigenous members. The position of the chair is reserved for indigenous person, who will enjoy the status of a Minister-of-the State. In addition, the chairpersons of three HDCs are also ex-officio members of the CHTRC (Article 3, Part C of the CHT Accord). In a word, substantial political representation of all indigenous communities has been ensured in the CHTRC along with non-indigenous people.
As an apex political and administrative body of CHT, the CHTRC is entrusted with specific power and functions. According to CHTRC Act 1998, the CHTRC has a mandate to coordinate and supervise all activities of three HDCs, general civil administration and law and order, and all other development activities/programs undertaken by the autonomous body and NGOs in CHT (see appendix B). Other functions include issuing license for heavy industry, disaster management and coordination of traditional and social justice.
The CHTRC does not have legislative power, although this was one of the most sought-after political demands of indigenous leaders. However, the CHTRC has an advisory role with regards to making any laws for CHT region (Article 53 of CHTRC Act 1998). It can provide recommendations to the central government in two ways: a) it can request the government to amend any law, which might have adverse effects on the development of CHT and well-being of indigenous people; and b) it may recommend making a new law, if necessary, for CHT region. On the other hand, the central government also has a prerogative to consult the CHTRC before making any law concerning CHT region.
The CHTRC’s “supervisory jurisdiction” applies not only to HDCs, but also extends over to the general administration and local government bodies of CHT (Roy
c. the hill district councils
Within the framework of the CHT Accord, the Hill District Councils (HDCs) have been established in each of three hill districts namely Rangamati, Khagrachari and Bandarban of CHT. These HDCs have more control over economic, social and cultural development in that they have the authority over a good number of subjects/departments which would be delegated to them by the central government, such as health, education, agriculture, culture, land management, commerce and trade and so on.
The composition of ethnic representation in the HDCs differs from each (see table 2), however each HDC is chaired by an indigenous person. Representation from all eleven indigenous communities including the Bengalis has been ensured in HDCs. Each councillor of the HDCs directly would be elected by the people. The chairpersons of HDCs enjoy the rank and status and the privileges of a Deputy Minister of the government (ADB, 2001).
Table 2: the composition of the HDCs
HDCs
|
Chair (indigenous)
|
Councillors
|
Total
| |
Indigenous
|
Bengalis
| |||
Rangmati HDC
|
1
|
22
|
11
|
34
|
Khagrachari HDC
|
1
|
23
|
10
|
34
|
Bandarban HDC
|
1
|
21
|
12
|
34
|
Source: HDC Acts, 1998 (Rangamati, Khagrachari and Bandarban)
To determine own economic, social and cultural development, Article 22 (HDC Act, 1998) provides that the central government would delegate authority to every HDCs over a total of 33 subjects and departments of the public services (see appendix B). Among the transferable subjects by the central government, the most important ones are education, mainly primary and adult education; health; agriculture and forestry; livestock; fisheries; cooperatives; commerce and industries; social welfare; culture; land and land management; development planning; local police; indigenous custom, tradition and social justice system; and jum (shifting) cultivation and so forth. Above all, HDCs are responsible for supervision, coordination and monitoring of the development activities carried out by local authorities. They are also responsible for supervision and maintenance of the law and order situation in respective district.
For the development in the respective district, the HDCs can prepare and implement development with own resources or funds from the central government (Article 42 of HDC Acts 1998). On the other hand, the central government also may formulate and implement development plans through the HDCs.
Like the CHTRC, the HDCs do not have power to make any law on any issues for respective district. However, if any law passed by the national parliament is found to be harmful for the interest of indigenous people in the respective district, the HDCs can write to the central government by explaining the problems (Article 79 of HDC Act, 1998). On the basis of their recommendations, the central government may take measure to amend or relax the application of that law in CHT.
In short, the HDCs appear to be the most powerful institutions in terms of delivering administrative functions and social, economic and cultural development for indigenous peoples including the Bengalis in CHT region. However, in practice, these institutions have not been empowered yet by the central government to exercise their full authority in respective district.
4.3 protection of land rights of indigenous peoples
As discussed in section 3, the land alienation process of indigenous peoples started with colonisation. This problem was exacerbated during the Pakistani rules by constructing the Kaptai Hydro electric dam. By the dam, hundred thousands indigenous peoples were displaced from ancestral lands, and 40% of total fertile land went under water. The Bangladeshi regimes made the situation worst by bringing thousands of thousands Bengali settlers into CHT from the plains (see section 3.3). With the full backing from both the civil and military administration, those Bengali settlers grabbed lands from indigenous people. This factor led to the violent conflicts and serious human rights violation upon indigenous people across CHT.
In such situation, one of the PCJSS’s objectives was to re-gain control over lands. To achieve this objective PCJSS demanded to stop the influx of the Bengali settlers into CHT, and withdrawal of all settlers who already settled in CHT illegally (see the point 3 in appendix A). Therefore, to settle the land problems and thereby to protect the indigenous land rights, the CHT Accord has included a number of measures.
First, delegation of authority to the HDCs authority over land and land management in respective district. The HDCs have the power to restrict land transfer i.e. no lands in CHT except the land of the public institutions as specified in the Accord, would be transferred in any forms such as lease, settlement, purchase or sale to anyone or institutions without “prior approval” of the HDC concerned (Article 64 of HDC Act 1998). Here the “prior approval” condition is the most important aspect for protecting indigenous people’s right to land. Moreover, the HDCs have the power to supervise and control the functions of lower-tier land and revenue administration officials[9] such as Headmen, Chainmen, Amins, Surveyors, Kanungos and Assistant Commissioners (land).
Secondly, the CHT Accord also provides for a Land Commission to settle the disputes over land ownership in CHT (Article 4, Part D of the CHT Accord). The Land Commission will be constituted with a retired judge of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, while the three traditional administrative chiefs, locally called rajas (kings), a representative of the CHTRC, and the chairperson of the HDCs will be the member of the Land Commission. The Commission has a mandate to follow the laws, customs and conventions prevailing in the CHT, while adjudicating the cases of land disputes between the indigenous peoples and the Bengali settlers. In other words, indigenous members in their capacities will be competent to advise the Land Commission on matters of customary systems of land and resource management, while resolving the land disputes.
Thirdly, the CHT Accord provides for the measures to redeem the lands from outsiders by cancelling leases (Article 8, Part D of the CHT Accord). It is notable that before signing the CHT Accord, a large of number of non-resident people from the plains took common lands on lease in the name of rubber and other commercial plantation in CHT. The CHT Accord has authorised the CHT institutions to cancel all the leases if the lands, which remain unutilised for ten years. At the same, the CHT Accord provides for ensuring land ownership to landless indigenous families by 2 acres for each family.
In sum, the CHT Accord has provided for a potential to protect the land rights of indigenous peoples in CHT, but the achievement of better outcome will depend upon the functional dynamics of the indigenous led institutions such as the CHTRC, HDCs and the Land Commission.
4.4 the obstacles to the implementation of the accord
In the preamble the Accord states its objective as to “uphold the political, social, cultural, educational and economic rights” of all people and to expedite the social and economic development in CHT. But in 13 years of the Accord, this objective seems to be a far cry for indigenous peoples as the implementation of the Accord has been stalled. There are many factors behind it, however, the following are considered to be most crucial.
Lack of political commitment: Although the CHT Accord was signed with too much enthusiasm, the successive governments did not show respect in implementation of the Accord in letter and spirit. Even the Awami League (AL) government, as a signatory party to the Accord, during its tenure (1996 – 2001) did not undertake effective measures for implementation of the Accord. Then the next BNP-led government (2001 – 2006), which was vehemently against the CHT Accord, did not take any tangible measures for implementation of the Accord (Jamil and Pandey, 2008). Larma (2003:9) attributes the total non-implementation of the Accord to the “chauvinistic mentality” of the Bengali Muslim ruling elite, intelligentsia and bureaucrats.
Non-devolution of power to the Hill Councils: this is also associated with lack of political will of the government. The Hill Councils - the CHTRC and HDCs were established with indigenous leadership, but no government, since signing the Accord, did take effective legislative and administrative measures for devolution of authority to these Hill Councils. As a result, to-date the CHTRC cannot play its full authority “to supervise, monitor and coordinate” all activities of the HDCs, general administration, and local government bodies in CHT (Roy
The root of conflict remains unaddressed: One of the root causes of conflict was the Bengali settlers, who were brought into CHT under the government-sponsorship in order to minoritise indigenous peoples in their lands (see section 3.4). Withdrawal of these Bengali settlers directly had not been addressed in the CHT Accord. It was reported that, the issue being politically too sensitive the government refused to put it in writing in the agreement, but it “verbally” promised to indigenous leaders into resettling the Bengali settlers outside CHT (CHTC, 2000: 14). However, the government denied any such verbal agreement. Resettlement and land grabbing by the Bengali settlers continue at large even in the post-Accord situation. As a result, very frequently there erupts violent conflict between indigenous people and the Bengali settlers.
Militarisation: The Accord provides for demilitarisation of CHT through withdrawal of all temporary military garrisons except six cantonments in CHT. This commitment has not been implemented yet. Instead a new military rule, called the Operation Uttoron (upliftment), has been imposed in CHT in the post-Accord situation. This military rule has allowed the army to control the functions of the general civil administration, law and order, and development work such as construction roads on one hand, and on the other, it continues to actively support the Bengali settlers under the “Shantakaran” (Pacification) and “Ashrayan” (shelter) projects (Larma, 2003:10). Even in the post-Accord period, PCJSS, a party to the Accord and local indigenous people on many occasions alleged the army’s role to let loose the Bengali settlers upon the indigenous villages in CHT, such as the recent violence happened on 25 February 2010 in Rangmati district, where 6 indigenous villagers got killed and 25 injured (Chakma, 2010a, and AI, 2010). In a word, the military interference in CHT affairs is still a serious threat to the implementation of the CHT Accord.
Section 5:
This section briefly discusses the possible challenges in implementation of the indigenous people’s right to self-determination. To implement the right to self-determination involves two aspects – legal and political. From the legal aspect, it is a universal human right for all peoples recognized by international law. Bangladesh as a member State Bangladesh Bangladesh
First, to-date recognition of distinct culture, language and identities of indigenous peoples has remained unresolved in the Bangladesh 13 April 2010 declared some sections of HDCs Act 1998 and the CHTRC Act 1998 as the contradictory to the “sanctity of the unitary state” (The New Age, 13 April 2010 ). Now, the case is under the review at the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court.
Second, the Bangladesh Bangladesh Bangladesh Bangladesh
Third, the CHT Accord has not been protected with constitutional safeguard. So, if any political government in power does not want to keep it, it can scrap off the Accord through a simple majority in the parliament.
Fourth, although the CHT Accord ended the long-standing armed conflict in CHT region, the implementation process now has been stalled due to various reasons such as lack of political support, non-devolution of power and military interference (see 4.2.4 in Section 4). Therefore, it appears that implementation of the rights in the CHT Accord largely will depend upon political will of the ruling party or friendly political relations between the central government and indigenous led CHT institutions – the CHTRC and HDCs.
Fifth, the CHT institutions namely the CHTRC and HDCs under indigenous leadership do not have power to make any laws or policies, although the central government has a prerogative to “consult” with them before making any laws with regards to CHT and indigenous people (see 4.2.2 in Section 4). On the other hand, the CHTRC and HDCs may make recommendations on any legislation to the central government. In case the central government does not respect their recommendations, these hill councils do not have veto power to stop implementing any law or programs against the will of the indigenous peoples.
Section 6:
--> conclusion
The struggle of indigenous peoples in CHT under the leadership of PCJSS since 1970s onwards demonstrates that indigenous peoples can take resort to the armed resistance if their right to self-determination is denied by the nation State. The indigenous peoples’ struggle is deeply rooted into the past history of self-rule and the aspiration to maintain own culture, languages and identities. The case of CHT, Bangladesh
Indigenous peoples of CHT once were independent under the leadership of traditional kings. Their rights had been diminished with colonisation, but the colonial rulers could not deny the indigenous self-rule system completely. Accordingly the Pakistan Bangladesh Bangladesh
Against the Bengali nationalism, indigenous leaders invented jumma nationalism to assert the right to self-determination of different indigenous ‘nations’ in CHT. Under the banner of own political party, PCJSS, they pushed their demand to the GoB for the right to self-determination, interchangeably autonomy with own legislation. Out of the paradigmatic conception of statebuilding, the newly independent Bangladesh
From the human rights perspective, the right to self-determination is a universal human right applicable for all peoples including indigenous peoples. This right is recognised in international law such as ICCPR, IESCR and UNDRIP. The adoption of the UNDRIP by the UN exclusively for indigenous peoples clearly gives a message that every State is bound to respect the indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination. But many States tend to interpret the right to self-determination from decolonisation context vis-à-vis secession or independence. From that perspective, they deny the indigenous people’s right to self-determination. In contrast to the state-centric view, indigenous peoples view self-determination as a fundamental collective human right which is essential for them to be in control of their own lives and destiny. So, they want such right by which they can freely determine own political arrangements and pursue economic, social and cultural development towards full enjoyment of their human rights. To achieve this goal, it does not necessarily involve secession or independence, but the right to self-determination has to be defined through mutual negotiation between the State and indigenous peoples concerned.
The same was with the case of CHT, Bangladesh Bangladesh
Consequently indigenous leadership i.e. the PCJSS had no other alternative options but to assert their rights with arms against the government. Despite the PCJSS took up arms, it always was open to dialogue for a peaceful and political solution to the indigenous problems in CHT. On the other hand, the GoB tried to solve the political problem through military means, but it could not bring any positive outcome from the fight against the indigenous insurgents for more than two decades.
Finally, the GoB had to recognise the importance of dialogue to negotiate about the rights of indigenous peoples. This realisation of the GoB has resulted in a peace agreement, known as the CHT Accord between the State and indigenous people in 1997. Through signing the Accord, the State has recognised the political voice and economic, social and cultural demands of indigenous peoples. To accommodate indigenous participation in the state affairs, the GoB established special governance structures such as the special ministry, CHTRC, and HDCs with indigenous leadership.
Despite these institutional arrangements for indigenous people, indigenous leadership has not been able yet to fully exercise their authority to determine own affairs in CHT. A good number of factors are responsible for it; however, the major ones are lack of political support, non-devolution of power to local authorities, policies of militarization, and minoritisation of indigenous peoples. Above all, the ‘unitary’ character of the state has not changed, for which the State denies the existence of its indigenous peoples in order to deprive them from their rights to self-determination interchangeably autonomy. This fact is reflected in the non-implementation of the CHT Accord.
In sum, it is interesting to note that, on one hand, from human rights perspective the right to self-determination is a universal human right for all peoples, including indigenous peoples. All States are bound to implement it. On the other hand, Bangladesh denies its indigenous peoples existence and their right to self-determination on the ground of the “unitary character” of the state, which is contradictory to the international human rights norms and principles. Therefore, the future research could examine the extent of the ‘unitary character’ of the Bangladesh
1. Several terms such as ‘tribal’, ‘hill men’, and ‘jumma people’ are used to refer indigenous peoples in CHT. In official documents, the term ‘tribal’ is widely used, which is derogatory for indigenous groups. Against the tribal identity, during1970s political activists constructed the term jumma (hill people, who used to practice jum (swidden) agriculture) to unite all indigenous communities in CHT. By contrast, many laws and policies pertaining to CHT, such as the CHT Peace Accord 1997 and CHT Regulation I of 1900 variably used the terms ‘tribal’ and ‘indigenous hillmen’ to refer all indigenous peoples in CHT, while the national Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) of 2005, 2008 and 2009 used the terms ‘indigenous people’ and ‘ethnic minority/adivasi’ to refer all indigenous groups in Bangladesh including that of CHT as a whole. During the Bengali term ‘adivasi’ (indigenous peoples) has been popularised to identify all indigenous peoples in Bangladesh as a whole. To avoid the identity debate, the term ‘indigenous peoples’ or ‘communities’ is used in this paper.
2. PCJSS (Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti, meaning the Chittagong Hill Tracts united people’s party) is an indigenous political party formed in 1973. It waged guerrilla war against the government of Bangladesh for autonomy in CHT.
3. The British government enacted a regulation in 1900 (known as CHT Regulation 1900) exclusively for the administration of CHT. By this Regulation, CHT was given a status of ‘Excluded Area’, by which non-residents were not allowed to buy land and settle permanently in CHT.
4. The article 6 (2) of the Bangladesh constitution 1972 reads that “all citizens of Bangladesh shall be known as Bangalis”.
5. Initially it was known as Gana Mukti Fouj (people’s liberation army). Later it came to be known as Shanti Bahini (peace forces) due to its popularity among the mass people in CHT.
6. In 1884, the CHT was divided into three Circles (traditional administrative unit) - Chakma Circle, Bohmong Circle and Mong Circle. Each of these Circles is named after the community and headed by a traditional chief, locally called raja (king). Each Circle consists of two lower units called mouza followed by villages.
7. By applying the policy of exclusion in the form of ‘Excluded Area’ status, the British rulers restricted outsiders to buy land and settle permanently in CHT in order to protect indigenous peoples from economic exploitation, on one hand; they did not allow indigenous people to participate in the democratic governance, and decision-making process on state affairs, on the other.
8. PCJSS negotiated with the successive governments from 1985 to 1997. From 1985 to 1988, the military-backed Ershad government held six rounds of talks with PCJSS. Then the BNP and the Awami League governments respectively held 13 rounds of talks from 1992 and 1995, and 6 rounds of talks from 1996 to 1997.
9. Except Headmen, other officials are appointed by the government and responsible for preparing land documents, maps, collecting revenue, survey and demarcation, and land transfer. Headmen are the traditional leaders, who are responsible for keeping land records, collection of revenue and certification of land ownership in case of land transfer, at local level.
10. On 19 August 2008 , the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a notice to the Ministry of CHT Affairs on the Bangladesh
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